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SOVIET STRATEGY, OBJECTIVES FOR MADRID CSCE

Paris LE FIGARO in French 10 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by Denis Legras: "Soviet Strategy for Madrid"]

[Text] Moscow: Denis Legras. If at Madrid the Soviet Union tries, by interposing Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, and incidentally also Romanians, to limit as much as possible the time of the 35 delegations which plan to meet on 11 November in the Spanish capital to examine the application of the Helsinki agreements, during which it fears looking like a defendant, it is no less determined to confront them, and even to counter-attack.

For it, it is not a question of "giving a polemical orientation to the Madrid meeting" says the magazine WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, but simply of "opposing the forces of certain Western countries" which have "pretensions with regard to the socialist countries."

The press commentaries, and particularly a small brochure edited by one of the Soviet delegates to Helsinki and Belgrade, Yuriy Kashlev and just published in one of the editions of the Novosti agency, give an exact idea of the "battle plan" of Muscovite diplomacy.

Basket by basket, the experts of the MID--the Soviet Quai d'Orsay [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] have drawn up their own balance sheet and have compiled the list of fields in which the Westerners in their eyes are far from fulfilling completely the undertakings made at Helsinki in 1975 by the 35 signatories of the final document.

With regard to the "Detente Code" placed in the first basket, for example, Moscow salutes the "Franco-Soviet Declaration" of 1977, the German-Polish agreements, and the treaty of friendship which henceforth links the Democratic Republic to the USSR. But, while in the Soviet capital they judge the mechanism of prior notification of military movements is operating satisfactorily, they nevertheless denounce the fact that "during the years which followed the Helsinki Agreement no progress has been made in the fundamental field of stopping the armaments race." And they denounce in passing "the fierce opposition of the NATO arms manufacturers and militarist circles to any Soviet initiative." Hence the necessity, they say in Moscow, of ratifying SALT II, of finishing up MBFR [Mutual Balanced Force Reduction], and also the tackling by this conference of "military detente and disarmament in Europe," the battle cry of the Warsaw Pact.

On the other hand there is another field in which the Soviet defense will be more difficult, and they pass over it in silence: Afghanistan. The argument that detente is divisible has been refuted many times. The press nevertheless persists in it, by accusing the Western powers, as SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA did several days ago, of wanting to use this file in Madrid to pursue their "anticommunist and antisoviet policy."

In the field of trade exchanges--the second section of the agreements--the Soviets also have reproaches to make, especially to the United States which, as Yuriy Kashlev writes, "has not yet abolished its discriminatory legislation on trade and credit concerning the USSR," to say nothing of the American embargo and the so-called strategic lists. The Europeans themselves are not exempt from criticism: they are accused, although they congratulate themselves on the development of trade with France, of not "fully utilizing their trade potential in East-West exchanges."

The American Restrictions

But from all the evidence it is in the third basket that the shoe pinches. While the Soviets do not want to hear anything about the "Rights of Man," which for them are only internal questions, they also have a word to say about the Western powers' respect for the Helsinki undertakings.

Deliberately forgetting the vexations to which particularly Western journalists are subject in the socialist countries, they denounce the "restrictions" imposed by the United States, especially on the movements of Soviet correspondents, the visas which are refused them, infiltration by Western secret services, and above all the propaganda of the "Free Europe" and "Liberty" radios, to their taste a too active survival of the Cold War. Of course they make no mention whatever of the creation last year of "Radio Moscow World Service," which possesses several dozen transmitters, one medium-wave, located in Cuba and which "sprays" the United States without the least embarrassment. But on the other hand they complain of the "disproportion" of cultural exchanges benefiting the USSR, and the hesitation of Europe to publish Soviet works or show films produced by Moscow studios.

They deliberately maintain a dialog of the deaf so as to avoid having to reply to the essential: the fate reserved in the USSR for "those who think differently," the dissidents. Their movement, whether they have religious, political, or artistic motivations, has been decimated in less than a year, and the trials have been taking place at an unprecedented rate since the Olympic flag was hauled down from its staff at the Lenin stadium. Nevertheless it seems as though one is witnessing a new concept of the "political" trial. The penalties are severe only if the defendant refuses to admit his "errors" and persists in denying that he has knowingly violated Soviet law.

We have therefore seen an "epidemic" of "confessions" which has surprised opposition circles and strongly shaken their convictions. The fact that Father Dmitri Dudko (in June), Lev Regelson at the end of September, both representatives of the orthodox movement, the fact that Viktor Kapitanchuk, turned witness for the prosecution, show their repentance, and with Viktor Sokirko have been given suspended sentences and freed after their trials, is for the USSR proof that despite the Western accusations there exists a justice independent of the government in the country of the Soviets.

It is of little importance that the "confessions" and these restrictions were obtained under doubtful conditions, and that they chose to subject the trials of the most sensitive to all kinds of pressures, as some "dissidents" still at liberty claim. Moscow thinks that it can reply, head high, to the Western accusations--the Soviets also have a file: that of the "professional prohibitions." The press made fun of these on the occasion of the electoral victory of Helmut Schmidt.

It is therefore sure of itself, or giving the impression that it is, that the USSR will present itself at Madrid on 11 November ready to reply point by point to the disagreeable questions which certain "capitalist" countries are preparing to ask it. It remains to be seen whether it will be convincing.

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KREISKY ELABORATES ON PARTY IDEOLOGY, DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

Vienna PROFIL in German 30 Sep 80 pp 18-27

/Interview with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, in Palma de Mallorca on 26 August 1980, by Helmut Voska: "My Political Testament"/

/Text/ PROFIL: 10 years of Kreisky and 10 years of PROFIL-- any thoughts about that ?

Kreisky: I can still remember very well when PROFIL was founded. I can remember that particular morning in my office when Georg Nowotny, a very talented journalist, first told me about it. And I can also remember that I made a mistake, as I have many times in my life. I was skeptical, I did not believe that such a magazine much as I wanted it to succeed would be able to make it on its own. I told Nowotny again and again that you would be dependent on your financiers one of these days and when that day came they would throw you aside like squeezed lemons. That was what I feared would become of PROFIL. Nowotny said I was wrong; he thought the chance of success was good; financial help would only be needed in the beginning; later one would be able to do without it. Then, as you and your publisher well know, PROFIL went through several crises and the fate of the magazine really hung by a thread. I heard about this and was genuinely concerned. You are well aware of that. The fact is that I may find this magazine hard to take at times but I consider it quite important for democracy in Austria. All the better for all of us that this magazine with which I have had many a fight now is economically sound. Let me modify a well-known quotation by saying: "If PROFIL did not already exist, one would have to invent it"-- but perhaps also an "anti-PROFIL."

PROFIL: Speaking for myself and for the magazine, let me thank you for your kind words.

Kreisky: Let me then follow up with some criticism right away. There is much in domestic affairs as much as anywhere that can be seen from a point of view other than that of mere exposure. No doubt there is an element of constructiveness in disclosure, but there is an element of destructiveness and denigration there as well. Democracy not only has a need of sharp criticism; it has an equal need of on-going, positive advice on the part of public opinion. In fact, there is no greater danger for political life than rigidity. When all is said and done, for instance, the AKH matter proved that not a single politician was criminally involved or was bribed.

PROFIL: Still, it was necessary to bring these things to light.

Kreisky: No doubt about it. As a matter of fact, there probably is a much higher incidence of bribery than we tend to assume. I openly admit that, much to my dismay. These things must come out; we must get proof. Austrian political life is in no danger of getting mired in corruption. I would even go as far as to say that corruption scandals, in political life above all, are rarer in Austria than in most other countries. Politicians are much more decent and much more honest than people tend to assume.

PROFIL: There is a certain similarity in the careers of Bruno Kreisky and of PROFIL. Neither was given much of a chance for success at first. In the case of PROFIL, it was said: "It will never work-- a magazine with intellectual pretensions in a country full of janitors; a magazine with liberal pretensions in a country without a liberal tradition and so on." And in your case, the talk was much the same: that you could not succeed-- as an intellectual, as a Jew, as a man who wanted to introduce a liberal element into social democracy. Contrary to the prognostications of professional journalists PROFIL did succeed to an extent; but you proved all the political pundits wrong by achieving a unique success, not only by Austrian standards. How do you explain that? How would ex-journalist Kreisky attempt to explain the political phenomenon Bruno Kreisky to his readers?

Kreisky: Much as I like to lampoon myself, I must forgo answering this question. But, if I attempt to explain why I enjoy a relatively large measure of confidence among the Austrian populace, then one of the objective factors --I

would not want to comment on the subjective ones-- would have to be that I am a man who spans more than one historical era. I personally experienced the collapse of the empire and the first republic. I was politically active as a young man when the first republic collapsed and personally shared in all the defeats my party suffered. I did not try to shirk them. Beyond the experiences I gained in the movement and with the movement and about the country, I also learned a lot about foreign countries. Among other things, I got to know a very well functioning democracy, that which exists in Sweden. This strengthened my conviction that democracy is feasible, that despite all the criticism and skepticism it is a political system that may not be perfect but that affords a hundred different opportunities for change which is something that can be done in a dictatorship only in bloody battles. All these experiences taken together have made me what I am.

PROFIL: In a matter of 3 years, you succeeded in turning the old, fossilized SPOe of the Pittermanns, Waldbrunnens, Probsts and Brodas into a young, intellectual party. Private enterprise, the farmers, even the princes of the church were no longer scared of the reds. The atheistic, doctrinaire, Marxist wing of the party did not dare speak up. What did the muzzle look like that you put on the comrades then ?

Kreisky: If you want to know a secret: there was no muzzle. Prior to this, there has never been a 10-year period in party history without an expulsion on political grounds. The party presidium has displayed an inordinate amount of tolerance. And yet, the left wingers did some of the most incredible things during my first years in office. On 1 May one year they behaved very rudely to Vienna's lord mayor...

PROFIL: To Bruno Marek...

Kreisky: He was a very popular mayor, as we all know. The party was fuming as it had every right to and I took the trouble of talking to the people and to make it clear to the ringleaders that they had picked the wrong party.

PROFIL: Perhaps there are times when leading SPOe functionaries get that feeling, too. At one point, you act like an ultra-conservative social democrat and at another point you make a big show of demanding a revival of ideology. Now, which is the real Kreisky ?

Kreisky: I have always considered myself a middle-of-the-roader and not a right-winger or a left-winger-- not a middle-of-the-roader who looks for a compromise solution every time but someone who is willing to listen to the opinion of one side and the other, too and possibly even to accept it but who will not hesitate to voice his own opinion. That, I believe, was what made it possible to effect rather important reforms in various fields and, concurrently, to keep the party in power from going off the deep end.

PROFIL: Could we return to the Bruno Kreisky of 1970...

Kreisky: It is impossible, if you will, to judge Bruno Kreisky, to figure him out without going along with his verbosity. But, to make sense of the world, that is what one must have-- an understanding of the connections.

PROFIL: But it makes interviewing you difficult. Kreisky, who is Jewish, becomes chancellor in Austria where there is some latent anti-Semitism. What does that feel like, from a strictly personal point of view ?

Kreisky: I had no feeling reaction to that at all. It was nothing new. The great leader of Austria's social democrats, Victor Adler, who would have become the leading figure of the first republic had he lived, also was of Jewish extraction. Both the great French socialist and one-time prime minister, Leon Blum, and Disraeli, the man who left a unique imprint on the British Empire in Queen Victoria's time, were of Jewish extraction. For that matter, I do not believe the Austrians deep down are any more anti-Semitic than other peoples. There is a bit of xenophobia in the Austrian makeup. True enough, they call the Germans names raking in the money from the summer tourists all the while and they call the Czechs names despite the fact that 50 percent of all Austrians have at least one Czech grandparent. They call people with red hair names and there are some who have it in for people with flat feet.

PROFIL: Not a particularly likable breed...

Kreisky: I would not put it that way. People tend to grumble; There is no point in dramatizing it. In the second republic I know of no case of anyone of Jewish extraction not being able to pursue the career he meant to pursue or for which he was suited.

PROFIL: What, would you say, were the reasons for the first SPOe victory in 1970: Kreisky-- what else ?

Kreisky: If I myself played a role, it did not come up until later, I think. It did not count as much in the 1970 election. At that time, there was a desire for change above all, for new ways of doing things, for more modern policies. It was not until later that it turned out I was a pretty good chancellor and that I at the very least did not do Austria any harm. For another thing, it worked to my advantage that I do enjoy a certain international prestige which is not particularly easy to come by as an Austrian.

PROFIL: You took a gamble then, together with Franz Jonas and Friedrich Peter; you formed a government without an absolute majority.

Kreisky: The minority government was not just my own idea. I did then what I do now when there are important issues to be decided. I ask people whose judgment I trust for advice. At that time I got together with Karl Waldbrunner and told him: "I have this idea of forming a minority government. I do not know how long it will stay in office. If it should fail, we would have to announce to the public 'let the voters decide what is to be done.'"

PROFIL: "Give Kreisky and his team a chance to do their job." Was that a party slogan ?

Kreisky: No. In fact, it was a slogan directed against me. The Vienna party organization was opposed to practising a personality cult. But since one could not very well leave my name out altogether, the words "and his team" were added. It was an attempt to get away from the personality cult.

PROFIL: It did not work. As for the slogan used later on "Kreisky - who else" that was taken over from the FRG ?

Kreisky: I do not know where it came from. I think it was developed by some young people from Upper Austria.

PROFIL: Not a bad slogan at any rate for a social democrat who rose from the position of journalist-chancellor to sun king and finally to the emperor's throne of the second republic.

Kreisky: That is a lot of nonsense.

PROFIL: Suppose you let the past 10 years pass in review and came up with a handbook for future politicians in which you told them the secret of how it is done.

Kreisky: First of all, a politician must work very, very hard. Josef Klaus already made that point. For another thing, you have to be lucky. There were some deputies in parliament once who called out to me: "You sure have been lucky." What I said to them was: "That may be true, but if I were stupid, I would not have known what to do about it." You also have to have a certain talent for politics. What Max Weber said about politics has become my credo: you have to take politics very seriously. You must give your all to politics and to the people. Even if it sometimes looks as though you are doing something with just one hand, that is not the way it ought to be. You have to serve politics with your total personality.

PROFIL: Are you a politician by instinct-- someone who immediately knows what is right and acts quickly and resolutely or someone who ponders and carefully thinks things out ?

Kreisky: Both. There are times when I act on instinct and reach quick decisions and then there are problems that are better left to ripen on their own.

PROFIL: Could you give us an example ?

Kreisky: I am thinking for instance of the way in which we developed our economic policy in 1974. Based on the experience of the thirties, I realized immediately that we had a crisis on our hands. I remember very well that I warned of this at one of the annual or bi-annual discussions with economic experts I held at my house. The experts smiled condescendingly; their advice was to hold on to stability policies. Gentlemen, I said at the time, we are on the wrong track; we are right in a crisis situation. We have to come up with a new policy. That was an example of a quick decision. The finance minister immediately went along even though as a young man he could not conceive of the crisis as I could having lived through one before. But then there are instances of slow, deliberate decisions. I rely on mature reflection mostly in...

PROFIL: ...in personnel matters ?

Kreisky: In personnel matters and on foreign policy issues I usually take a long time.

PROFIL: But particularly in foreign policy matters, one gets the impression that you are quick to make a disparaging remark.

Kreisky: Here in Mallorca 2 years ago I gave an interview to a Dutch journalist, using very mild and conciliatory language about Begin as compared to what is being said about him by governments all over the world today. What I said then was meant as a warning-- not with the intention of insulting the man but of warning of him. It may have seemed impulsive but in fact it was dead right. I am sure there are statements that I make on the spur of the moment; but I am prepared to stand by them. On very rare occasions I have had to revise a statement I have made; but I cannot remember ever having had to retract one. In my opinion, they were right at the time I made them. I mean at that moment. In politics, things change very often and very quickly. There is no point in being dogmatic.

PROFIL: If people refer to you as a show star or a public relations genius, do you take that as a compliment or as an insult?

Kreisky: I would not say it is insulting, but it is negative and, for all that, it is wrong. The TV journalists who come in contact with me are well aware of the fact that I do not even know where the camera is. If there is a secret of how to do well on TV, then the only piece of advice I can offer is to forget the camera and to speak as one normally does.

PROFIL: No one knows how to butter up the Austrians better than you. Is that a gift from on high; is it a special knack or an intellectual device?

Kreisky: I would maintain that I never buttered the Austrians up but that I told them things that were far from pleasant. Take our Middle East policy. After all the things that happened in the Nazi era, the Austrians felt very comfortable adopting a bit of a pro-Israeli stance. It was acceptable for one and all-- even for the old Nazis. The old Nazis were ready to accept it because the Israeli soldiers had shown proof of their courage and military virtue which is something that impresses right wingers and others were impressed by other things. Furthermore, it was far away from Austria which made it easy to afford oneself the luxury of sympathizing. I thought otherwise. I said again and again that it would be very dangerous in the long run to close our eyes to the

Arab world. But this policy of mine was rejected by all and sundry. Let's take domestic policy: Did I make myself popular by coming out for the big solution as regarded the state-owned industries? Benya was at my side when our own shop stewards gave us the business. All of Austria listened in; we did not keep anyone from doing so. We came up with an entirely new kind of policy. Before hundreds of VOEST shop stewards we spoke out for a solution they opposed with all their heart and we did the same thing in Styria. We have done quite a few unpopular things. When the Pohnsdorf mine had to be shut down, which previous governments had not dared do, I went there and explained things to the miners after a lot of preparations. And when that crisis came up in Judenburg, I went to the assembly plant and talked to the workers for hours. What about the village signboard crisis in Carinthia? Who was right in the midst of it? I was also there when there were demonstrations on the Ballhausplatz, when the farmers protested and so on. Nobody can accuse me of saying what people want to hear-- quite the contrary. As it happens, I have told them some very bitter truths. For instance, I told them they can collect all the tractors they want for their demonstrations-- it still will not do any good because if I gave in, there would be a demonstration every week. I would say this accusation is based on a total misconception of my policies. Look at the major aspects of these policies and you will find that they were generally unpopular to begin with.

PROFIL: But it is true, is it not, that you never adopt an unambiguous position and that by equivocating you are able to address any available majority of Austrians at any time. Out of the most contradictory statements you often make your listeners seem to gain the impression that Kreisky agrees with every one of them.

Kreisky: That is not true. I give a very clear answer very often. On certain rare occasions I am not prepared to supply an unequivocal answer right away.

PROFIL: Erika Pluhar, a very beautiful as well as intelligent woman, thought until recently --just to give an example-- that you were 100 percent against Zwentendorf ever going into operation.

Kreisky: I think you are oversimplifying Erika Pluhar's position. She knows perfectly well that I am not opposed to nuclear energy and she knows equally well that I am not one of the great believers in nuclear energy and beyond that,

she knows that I have said, if so many people are worried about it, let us have a referendum. And she also knows that I said prior to the election that there would be no referendum unless there was a two-thirds majority for it in parliament and that I would stick to this position come what may. I made a pledge before the election and I tell you quite frankly, if it had been up to me, the matter of the politicians' privileges would already be settled one way or the other. In any case, there would be an answer by now, but the politicians in parliament wanted to reserve decision on it for themselves. I cannot help that. I tried.

PROFIL: You would deny the allegation that you make a conscious effort to frame your words so as to obtain a majority.

Kreisky: I would deny it.

PROFIL: And if it were subconscious, you could not really say, but...

Kreisky: There are certain situations where I will not give the answer a journalist is looking for. And when I do not give it to him, he should be aware of it.

PROFIL: We seem to be getting a little closer to the Kreisky secret. Let me add up some obvious contradictions. You have governed this republic longer and more intensively than any prior political leader, although at the outset you had no hope of becoming chancellor. And if one compares your statements over a longer period of time, you have not been too particular about the truth.

Kreisky: Now just a moment.

PROFIL: Nonetheless you are looked upon as the most trustworthy politician. Your made-to-order 5,000 Schilling shoes and your fine English suits make you look upper middle class and yet you are the leader of the socialists. You are on TV more often than any hero of any serial and yet the audience does not get tired of you.

Kreisky: I would dispute that. I always tell the truth as I see it and would like to stress that one of the secrets of my success, to my mind, is that I tell people the truth.

PROFIL: That is not meant as an insult. Today you simply tell the truth that is valid today but by the day after tomorrow it turns out to be an untruth.

Kreisky: In politics it is possible that something is out of the question on a given day. That is the reason for saying "rebus sic stantibus" or as things are today. But that does not mean that they will stay that way forever.

PROFIL: You are politician who cannot be pinned down. One example...

Kreisky: I know I once said there would be no reform of ORF and then it happened anyway. Mr Bacher peddled that one for a time...At the time I said there were no plans for a media reform, there actually were no plans for it. But when some gross abuses came to light, the reform became necessary. Any policy which clings to one statement or another is wooden, inflexible, wrong and dogmatic. One must be prepared to state openly: this is a new situation which requires a new approach.

PROFIL: Can we get back to upper middle class Kreisky...

Kreisky: It may well be that I have been wearing suits made of good material for a long time but for all that my clothing budget is no higher than that of a medium-level bank employee.

PROFIL: Do other members of the government spend more than you do ?

Kreisky: I do not want to go into that. As for me, I wear the same things for a very long time. Strangely enough, the amount I spend on shoes is not higher either because hardly anyone wears the same pair of shoes for 30 years as I do. I just mention that as an aside; these are private matters. Anyone is entitled to look into my life style. As far as I can tell, I live much like any other democratic head of government. Quite a few foreigners seem to think my life style is far below the average...One should not forget that most countries provide their head of government with a very large house and the domestic staff to go with it. Every Austrian ambassador is provided with one but I am not. I have never tried consciously to adhere to a "proletarian life style" because I would have considered that a hypocrisy. For that matter, the life style of the workers has changed a great deal, too. I do not have a particular yardstick that I adhere to. I live the way I think it proper for me to live. And since everyone is at liberty to look into the way I live...

PROFIL: As to the substance of your policies: Professor Pelinka whom we invited to comment on 10 years of social democratic rule told us he was "hard put not to write a satire." According to him, the few political changes were all effected without Kreisky's help or merely tolerated and in some instances slowed down by him.

Kreisky: Professor Pelinka would do better to look at things from the point of view of a scientist rather than a feature writer. Then he will have an easier time foregoing the need to compose a satirical piece. Every Austrian will reject such an appraisal. Seven million Austrians who know better from their own experience are simply not going to listen to spurious tales spun by unrealistic intellectuals who live in ivory towers.

PROFIL: If one trusts the studies conducted by SPOe deputies Novotny and Heinz Fischer, you have lost the fight against poverty and for more equality-- where poverty is measured as against the living standard of the rich in this country and not as against the poor devils in the developing countries.

Kreisky: It is certainly true that a prolonged period of prosperity helps certain occupational groups attain a higher level of affluence in relative terms. I would be the last person to deny it. But the poor do not get richer, if the rich get poorer. That is not the way it works. I saw this in Sweden. It was one of the lessons I learned. Now Sweden's taxes are among the highest and now everybody suffers under this burden. Even in a country which has an income tax of around 80 percent there was no way of achieving more equality in a positive sense. In any event, I will see to it that we do not pursue a policy which would be the kiss of death-- simply to satisfy some ridiculous notion of egalitarianism spawned in the brains of ivory tower intellectuals.

PROFIL: You did not succeed in separating politics from business. The Winters, Wilflings and Seftiks are the outcome of socialist rule or would you dispute that? What is your opinion of this dynamic generation of young technocrats whose views on morality are rather flexible? And what do you think of their tough, shameless business practices, their cliquishness, the shady deals and lust for money and their faith in the attainability of just about everything?

Kreisky: There is not a single case of political corruption anyone can cite that approaches those of the CeVP era in seriousness, such as those involving Krauland, Polcar or Muellner. If it were not for this stupid "Consultatio" business or to put it even more bluntly, this ridiculous dogmatism at any price, there would be nothing at all along these lines. But I do not deny it-- any prosperous society is bound to breed wheeler-dealers. And there are some among them who are smarter than others, if they can work their deals. As for me, I have never wanted any part of this and I put it to you that there are no more people of this type here in Austria than there are in Germany, England or France. It is simply a phenomenon peculiar to this phase of our economic development.

PROFIL: Traditional anti-fascist tenets of the SPOe have been thrown overboard. A new election law helped upgrade the FPÖe; five former Nazis joined your government; Friedrich Peter is closer to you than Wiesenthal.

Kreisky: I have no relations with Mr Wiesenthal at all and as for Peter, I have the kind of political relationship to him that is customary in a democracy. And those five Nazis-- that is a gross generalization. We have done our utmost to make people understand the nature of dictatorship and fascism.

PROFIL: Does the fact that the SPOe spent several months debating the pros and cons of selling tanks to Chile bear out Pelinka's contention? A true-blue social democrat would take but a minute to turn the deal down.

Kreisky: The fact that we were not happy with the deal from the start becomes evident when you consider that we did not conclude it. Even in a socialist party there are differences of opinion regarding various aspects of such a deal. We discussed them thoroughly even though the majority of the workers and those concerned actually were in favor of delivery.

PROFIL: The main point you made during the last election campaign was: "Things should not get worse." That does not sound like a clarion call or is it meant as one?

Kreisky: Not really. The significant thing about this government was that we reinstituted the economic policies which had been worked out between industry and labor alone during the coalition and the CeVP government eras. We have turned this matter over to the government. Wherever possible, we naturally try to work out a consensus with labor and industry. And if Mr Pelinka knew anything about economics, he would be aware of the structural changes that have taken place in the state-

owned industries which are also directed toward greater co-determination for the workers. If he had a better understanding of things, he might ask himself why Austria did not have an economic crisis such as took place in all industrial nations, complete with high unemployment and a fairly high rate of inflation.

PROFIL: In Switzerland and in Germany there was no crisis either. But let us return to the subject: "The overlong exercise of power and political influence could create the impression among young people that the social democrats are a party like any other. One gets tired of personalities. One gets the feeling the party is no longer able to provide answers to the questions posed by society." That is not a quote from Pelinka but from Kreisky, dated 1972. Now, 8 years later-- have we reached that point ?

Kreisky: No. That was meant as a word of caution and of warning which is just as valid today. Take the referendum about nuclear energy 2 years ago. Was there ever an Austrian government or a majority party which called for a referendum on an issue on which it commanded a majority ?

PROFIL: Was it not simply done because there was no other way to do it ?

Kreisky: We could have decided the matter in parliament.

PROFIL: But that would have been a sure way of losing your absolute majority as SPOe rail union chief openly admitted.

Kreisky: Perhaps. But the fact remains that we conducted the first referendum. We put the matter before the people.

PROFIL: You once said "my job is my hobby," Mr Chancellor. When you retire, how do you expect to survive both without a job and without a hobby ?

Kreisky: I have enjoyed my job and I still do, even if it is tiring at times. Once I no longer have this job, I will look for another, equally enjoyable way of occupying myself. I will do some writing and give lectures and do a number of other things for which I am thoroughly preparing myself.

PROFIL: You were there when Emperor Francis Joseph was buried, you lived through one of the most horrible periods of modern history, you have been Austria's chancellor for 10 years-- what would you want to tell to Austria's young people ? What would your political testament be ?

Kreisky: A difficult question such as this calls for a very responsible answer. I refuse to deal with it in an aphoristic manner. Let me try for a comprehensive answer. First of all, I would want to impart to the young people the boundless optimism which still animates me, shortly before my 70th birthday. The fact that I have lived through so much and have looked down into the abyss is the reason why I am optimistic. Because I have also lived through the phenomenal years of progress. I was a witness to a poor, oppressed Austria with its hundreds of thousands of unemployed, who were not only demoralized by the misery but who were turned into more or less compliant, passive raw material for all these terrible changes which they neither opposed, nor were able to resist. I can still remember what people told me at the end of the war. Why leave this flourishing country where you have all the opportunities in the world and go back to Austria? Austria will never amount to anything politically or economically. "What is Austria's destiny," someone once said. "They will lock the door behind it and leave the key at the main station." Well, I have seen and lived through this almost miraculous rise in Austria's economic fortunes. I have seen political customs and manners change. Hatred among the parties has turned into opposition which can always be bridged and which never goes so far as to destroy human relationships. I worked very hard on that among other things during the coalition era. I have seen a poor country become a relatively rich country. Switzerland and Sweden, Belgium or Holland-- you cannot compare us with them. There was still something left there after the war; we were left with absolutely nothing. For all these reasons I am optimistic and for one more besides. If certain stereotype questions are included in a public opinion poll such as xenophobia, anti-Semitism, racism, national pride and so on, one finds that the answers given by young people are far more positive than those given by members of the older generation. All these attitudes are apparent to a much lesser degree among the young. There is less racial prejudice; they do not know all the things that go with it. There is a lot of skepticism and even a little cynicism, that is true, but that can all be turned into something creative.

I would therefore call on young people to participate in public life with a watchful, critical mind. And if there was one thing in particular that made me propose the Zwentendorf referendum to the party presidium, it was my conviction that we should not make young people feel that we would coldly use the power we had and ram things through over their heads.

That was a risky business. It meant that the plant might not go into operation, but young people must get the feeling that it is meaningful for them to take part in the political process. Nothing would be more harmful for the future of democracy than to brush off participation by young people. Of course there are always people who say that the young only constitute a minority and that the vast majority of people tend to accept things the way they are and really do not care. But what would have become of the social democratic movement, if we had not paid heed to this minority from the very start. A member of the Austrian high aristocracy said something in those early days which still impresses me today. He had listened to a speech by Dr Victor Adler at a small inn in Hainfeld and then said to the district governor of Lilienfeld: "Where eagles (Adler) roost, more eagles are likely to congregate." If one is dissatisfied with the party, one should join in and help change it. No one can tell me that political parties cannot be changed-- for better or for worse. No one can tell me that political parties cannot be or become more watchful. And no one can tell me that it is ineffectual to be active in a political party even if one does not hold the top spot.

PROFIL: In conclusion, let me ask you an impertinent question which I only dare put to you because of a particularly juicy Kreisky quote I have found. "I was especially impressed by my grandmother," it reads, "who died exactly when she wanted to die-- on the Monday following Hitler's occupation of Austria." Is there a special date on which you would want to die in order to impress others ? Once Hannes Androsch has become chancellor and the owner of all the tax consultant firms in Austria ?

Kreisky: I do not have to impress anyone. At any rate, I am not the type of person to die in order to impress people. I have every intention of living on as long and in as good health as possible. But I am not like the old Indian one of my friends told me about recently. "He who lives long," the saying goes, "will sit on the river bank and watch the bodies of all his enemies float by." I have no real out-and-out enemies. Perhaps now I will get some; I do not know. But up to now, I do not have any such enemies who might be animated by the desire to destroy me. I also do not like to see others destroy themselves. There still are things that I like to do; I still like to ski for instance and to play tennis. I consider it quite an achievement for a man of seventy to run around on the tennis court "like crazy" as my trainer puts it and to be able to ski fairly well

But I want to reiterate that I have no intention of duplicating Adenauer's career. No one need fear that I will stay in politics any longer than absolutely necessary. This term still is necessary; the next one does not seem to be. But who can tell ? If it was useful for me to assume office, perhaps the same can be said about my leaving it...

9478

CSO: 3103

CAGATAY CALLS FOR OPPOSITION COOPERATION

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 29 Sep 80 p 1

/Text/ Nicosia -- The National Unity Party /NUP/ held its first minor convention yesterday at the Misirlizade Cinema in Nicosia.

The convention opened at 1100 with a moment of respect for Ataturk and the war dead, followed by an address by Prime Minister and NUP Chairman Mustafa Cagatay. Cagatay spoke of party and government accomplishments and economic and political matters.

After Prime Minister Cagatay's address, the meeting was closed to the press.

Cagatay's Speech

Speaking on a variety of topics in his address before the NUP minor convention, Prime Minister and Party General Chairman Cagatay said the following on the intercommunal talks:

"We believe that the intercommunal talks are the only place for the solution of the Cyprus problem and that there is no alternative to this. We are asking in our proposals that the Greek Cypriots end their economic blockade of our community and are repeating our just demands in this regard."

Embargo

According to a TURKISH AGENCY CYPRUS report, Prime Minister Mustafa Cagatay noted that the Greek Cypriot economic embargo was among the factors prohibiting the equality of the Turkish community and continued as follows:

"Lifting this outdated embargo will lead the way to the peace for which our island longs and will facilitate resolution of the political problems. For this reason, we are waiting for the Greek Cypriot answer to our just proposals before re-evaluating the intercommunal talks for the future."

Economic Problems

In the part of his speech dealing with the Turkish community's socioeconomic problems, Cagatay said that the basic sources of these problems were not in the communal structure and made the following comments:

"The major causes of the gathering problems is that the Cyprus problem is as yet in a climate of political stalemate. The Greek Cypriot side, which has our federated state under economic blockade, is also putting an economic and political embargo on everything we want to do; it applies blackmail, threats and pressures to foreign sources wishing to establish political and economic relations with us."

Cagatay pointed out that another important cause was the reflection on this blockaded economic structure of the economic crises in the world and in Turkey, and continued as follows:

"Foreign crises also damage our economy, which is always under Greek Cypriot pressure. Using the same monetary unit as Turkey deprives us of the opportunity to put our economic policy within realistic bounds. Therefore, every crisis in Turkey reflects doubly on our weak structure."

"Our combined destiny in joy and sorrow with the Turkish motherland also makes itself felt in this area. Therefore, while our own state strives to overcome the economic bottlenecks, we sincerely hope for the recovery of the Turkish economy."

Appeal to Opposition

Criticizing the opposition in his speech, Prime Minister Cagatay noted that the opposition has duties and tasks of its own in overcoming the community's difficult days and said, "Our young democracy, abused by political and economic woes, cries out for a constructive opposition. I regret to have to say here that the opposition is a long way from answering this need."

Cagatay appealed to the opposition to cooperate in protecting the interests of the Turkish community and bringing the community through periods of strain.

Dedication

Prime Minister and NUP General Chairman Mustafa Cagatay had the following to say on the Iran-Iraq war:

"The Iran-Iraq war is taking place in the most important oil region of the world. It is clear that this war will add a terrific burden to the cost of oil production. I am forced to bring to mind in this context the need to rededicate ourselves as a community in order to ward off the consequences of war in the Middle East which also brings with it economic woes."

8349

CSO: 4907

CYPRUS AIRWAYS REACH CROSSROADS

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 16 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] **CYPRUS Airways** began its operations in 1948 with three Dakota aircraft, and except for a brief period following the 1974 Turkish invasion, it has made steady progress.

At present, while the company contemplates its choice of wide-body jet, **Cyprus Airways** seems to be at a new threshold that will determine the new course that the company will adopt in the future. In view of the scheduled Annual General meeting next week, we examine the company's history, its record and its future.

The Annual General meeting of Cyprus Airways that will consider the 1979 Annual Report and Accounts is to be held on October 23, 1980, only two months before the end of 1980. This sort of a delay in considering the previous year's accounts is totally unacceptable, because shareholders are kept in ignorance of the company's position for too long.

Though the Government has stated that it wishes to encourage investment in stocks and share, it has been observed that many Government controlled or sponsored companies are very late in complying with the law, and do not provide adequate and timely information to shareholders.

Shareholder confidence

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Under the present conditions of economic uncertainty the provision of timely information may do much to increase shareholder confidence and to encourage sound investment practices. It is hoped that next year Cyprus Airways can manage to hold its Annual Meeting before June (at least).

It is sad and unfortunate that the company's very able chairman, Mr G. Eliades, died earlier this month, and cer-

tainly the Vice chairman, Mr George Chrysafinis, will have to work hard to fill the gap created. One of the matters that both the Government and the chairman should examine are the composition of the Board itself.

The next four years are liable to be very difficult for Cyprus Airways, because of the uncertainty regarding the future of the tourist industry, the difficult economic situation in which Cyprus will find itself, high fuel costs, and the huge investments that the company will have to make in new aircraft.

It is therefore important that Government policies be closely coordinated

with these of the company, and this could be done by changes in the Board, and particularly by the appointment of a representative of the Cyprus Tourism Organisation and a representative from a major economic planning or coordination Ministry or office.

Almost destroyed

by '74 war

It should be noted that over the last seven years the Board has remained unchanged except for one post (there are 13 directors).

In 1973 Cyprus Airways carried 262,000 passengers, had a revenue of £6.1 min and profits of £125,000. At that time it was considered that prospects were grim owing to the Middle East War, the oil crisis and European inflation; but in fact the 1974 war almost destroyed the company. The Turkish invasion shattered the company's hopes, put an end to its development programme and inflicted a severe financial blow on Cyprus Airways.

The entire fleet of fine planes, four Tridents and one BAC III, were at Nicosia Airport. One Trident was burnt completely, one seriously damaged, and three aircraft slightly damaged. Negotiation with the insurers were difficult but the compensation

claims appear to have been settled.

On February 8, 1975, Cyprus Airways was able with three Viscount aircraft to restart its operations, initially to Athens, Beirut and Tel Aviv. The operation of these routes was successful, and on September 1, 1975 a lease agreement with McDonnell Douglas allowed the company to operate two DC8-30 aircraft and expand operations to London and Cairo.

In 1975, 137,000 passengers were carried, and 3.5 m/m kilograms of freight and though there was an overall loss it was clear that the company was making a remarkable recovery.

During 1976 passengers traffic increased by 64%, and cargo volume by 70%, helping the company to a very good profit of £514,000. A DC8-32 was obtained for the Larnaca/London route, and in November 1976 two BAC 111's replaced the DC-9's.

Controversial decision

At the time the decision to buy BAC 111's was somewhat controversial partly because the aircraft were towards the end of their production life, but also because it was widely expected that Russian aircraft would at least be considered.

In 1977 the fleet was further expanded by the acquisition of a third BAC 111 and a CL 44 freighter. Profits in 1977 were 240,000.

In 1978 the increase in passenger traffic of 16% over 1977 created problems for

Cyprus Airways, and complaints were voiced during the summer about overbookings and passengers being left behind. The company acknowledges that some of the complaints were genuine, but states that

the problems arose because the public did not cooperate, and a large number of passengers disregarded procedures and do not travel on the day they book a flight.

In August 1978 over 30% of the total traffic failed to join their flight to London. These problems continued and became even more difficult in 1979. During these two years the airline acquired three Boeing 707 aircraft.

In 1979 Cyprus Airways carried 387,000 passengers, an increase of 23% over 1978, freight traffic also increased, and revenue reached almost £21 m n. Profits were £416,000, which is low in relation to turnover.

Low profit for turnover

The company argues that policy of the company is to contribute as much as possible to the promotion of the island as a tourist centre. In pursuance of this policy a significant part of the budget is spent on direct advertising, joint advertising with the Cyprus Tourism Organisation, and the provision of travel facilities to various people associated with the tourist industry.

The company reports that in order to improve further its services, it has undertaken a comprehensive study of its aircraft requirements beyond 1983. It is known that the

company has recently shown interest in the acquisition of a small business jet, and has tested one produced by Hawker Siddeley.

Presumably this is to be used for official visits by the President and others abroad, by journalists, and perhaps businessmen wanting the extra luxury of hiring their own

jet. If these are the motives then Cyprus Airways should examine the project carefully because it is unlikely to prove profitable.

There is a need however, for a small aircraft which is economical, probably a propeller jet, for short routes with low passenger potential. Routes such as that to Benghazi and to Damascus must lose money with the present low traffic levels and the use of planes designed to take higher load factors. Such routes should therefore be served by more economical aircraft, if the cost savings are adequate to justify the purchase of a plane.

With regard to the Damascus route, this could possibly have been more profitable if weekend tours had been organized and more serious attempts at promotion tried.

Wide-bodied question

The big question is which wide-bodied jet will Cyprus Airways buy. Unconfirmed information suggests that the Air Bus is out because it has inadequate range and that Cyprus Airways will order a McDonnell-Douglas DC-10. This seems to be supported by the massive advertising campaign in the local press and on TV designed to increase public grounding of all such aircraft in the U.S.A.

It should also be noted that the Sales Director of McDonnell-Douglas visited Cyprus last August, and it is possible that the decision to launch the advertising campaign

was part of a joint strategy to overcome customer resistance to the plane.

The alternative under consideration appears to be the new Boeing 767, but there may be problems with delivery dates for the aircraft.

In view of the vast investment needed to acquire a widebodied jet, it is to be hoped that Cyprus Airways and the Government jointly undertake a detailed study into the choice of aircraft. Up to now the procedure seems to have been for Cyprus Airways to spend a long time examining the options, and then leaving the Government little and no time expertise to consider the report.

Case for more share capital

In view of the rapid increase in fixed assets since 1973, when fixed assets were about £4.4m to almost £15m in 1979, it would seem that there is scope for increasing the share capital of the company to reflect this changed situation. It

would also seem advisable for the company to consider selling shares to the public, as one way of partly financing new aircraft purchases. Considering the progress achieved by the Company since 1974, it is surprising that its share capital has hardly changed.

Another comment relates to the presentation of the annual report. The report should contain much more information about the company's activities. A consistent set of statistics relating to passengers carried, freight carried, revenues from freight and passengers, number of staff by division of the company, should be provided so that shareholders can monitor progress more easily. In addition each Annual Report should include a description of the aircraft used by the company including whether they are owned or leased.

Analysis of the substantial achievements of the company, suggests that there is a lack of imagination in the planning of the company's activities. The tourist figures suggest that Sweden will become one of the most important source of tourists to Cyprus, yet Cyprus Airways has not yet announced plans to fly there and to other parts of Scandinavia.

Computerised booking

Similarly, there appears to be potential in teaming up with other airlines in order to expand services by Cyprus Airways to the Middle East and to develop new routes.

Perhaps Cyprus Airways could even develop a trans-Atlantic route in conjunction with other Middle East or Mediterranean airlines. In fact some Middle Eastern airlines are already cooperating closely together on computerised booking systems and trans-Atlantic flights.

On the hotly debated issue of whether to allow chartered flight into Cyprus, we believe that Cyprus Airways is basically right. Chartered flights, if they are to be allowed, should be restricted and strictly controlled. This is because the mass of tourists, and the type of tourist that will come on chartered flights, will turn Cyprus into a new concrete jungle like the Costa Brava or Larnaca.

But since Cyprus is at a locational disadvantage in comparison to Spain, it cannot afford massive construction to serve the needs of mass tourism.

In addition, chartered flights are likely to leave too much power in the hands of the big holiday package operators in the U.K. and other countries, and that eventually the bargaining position of Cyprus hotels will become extremely weak. Essentially the tour operators will be reaping the benefits and not Cyprus.

TRANSPORTATION SEEN AS KEY TO TOURISM

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 30 Sep 80 p 1

[Article by Akay Cemal]

[Text] The TFSC [Turkish Federated State of Cyprus]'s tourism and air transportation problems were discussed a meeting held yesterday. KTHY [Turkish Cypriot Airlines] President Peker Turgud, Tourism Ministry Undersecretary and Turkish Cypriot Tourism Operations, Ltd. Deputy Director General Ekrem Yesilada and executive board member Rustem Tatar attended the meeting at which an evaluation was made of the problems, primarily transportation, confronting northern Cyprus, which has a great potential for tourism in all respects.

It was noted in this context that the air bridge created by the Turkish Airlines' Milano-Ercan route during the last tourist season had a positive effect on Turkish Cypriot tourism and views were expressed on other such initiatives and measures that could be taken.

Depreciation

Tourism authorities, meanwhile, stated that both the Foundations and Tourism Operations as well as the private hotels were having trouble maintaining superior services and quality and noted that keeping prices so low in comparison with comparable hotels in Turkey and Europe also increased the depreciation rate.

Noting that the tourism economy throughout the world is kept going by material contributions by states and governments, the tourism officials said, "The hospitality and cheerfulness of the Turkish community and those who provide tourist services ensure that a tourist will return to the TFSC. How much better will tourism be in this regard if it operates on its own steam? We do not even want to think about tourism without the transportation provided by adequate state assistance."

What Does Bellazi Say?

Italian tourism expert Mr Bellazi, who also attended yesterday's meeting, has been the target of intense pressures by the Greek Cypriots because he sends tourist groups to the TFSC. In a conversation with him after the meeting, Mr Bellazi said that the TFSC was a place where tourists could spend a pleasant holiday and pointed out that Italian tourists who come here have been overwhelmed by the hospitality of

the Turkish people. Indicating that hotel prices in the European nations, Egypt, Tunisia and even the Greek Cypriot sector could not compare with prices here, Bellazi said that in addition to low fares, the superior service in the TFSC is compared to many nations attracted tourists.

It will be recalled that at the last session of the intercommunal talks, the Turkish side strongly protested the intense Greek Cypriot pressures against the agencies bringing Italian tourists and drew attention to this behavior as abusing the principles of good will with which this session of the talks had begun as well as violating article 6 of the Denktas-Kyprianou agreement.

Direct Flights

Commenting on the importance to tourism of direct flights, the Italian tourism expert pointed out that tourists preferred direct flights hands down and that direct flights were also advantageous as to time and expense. He said that if the transportation problem were resolved, there would be about 7,000 tourists per year coming from Italy alone.

In conclusion, Mr Bellazi said, "KTHY must help as soon as possible to resolve the transportation problem, which is blocked for political reasons. Otherwise, it will be very unfortunate and the TFSC economy will be deprived of a great source of income."

8349

CSO: 4907

POLL: ONLY 23 PERCENT SAY COUNTRY MEETS NATO OBLIGATIONS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Oct 80 p 8

[Article by Asger Schultz, Danish Gallup Institute]

[Text] In an earlier survey the Gallup Institute found that a majority of voters supported the so-called "zero increase" and thereby opposed the NATO desire to bring defense up to date which was considered a vital necessity.

The institute has now carried out a new survey in which the "zero solution" was placed in a broader context including aid to developing countries, our military capability and the extent to which voters feel we are living up to our NATO obligations.

The result of this survey showed that the Danish voter does not feel "it does any good" to oppose increased appropriations but he doesn't think we are meeting our obligations anyway.

In the latest survey a representative selection of the adult population had to answer the following question first:

"Within total NATO planning goals have been set for individual countries to achieve as a step in total defense. Do you know or do you think that Denmark achieves the goal set for this country?"

Here are the answers stated in percentages:

	Yes	No	Don't know	Total
Total	23	48	29	100
To right of Soc Democrats	18	63	19	100
Social Democrats	31	42	27	100
To left of Soc Democrats	23	52	25	100
For NATO	27	59	14	100
Against NATO	24	54	22	100
Don't know	13	21	66	100

Thus almost half the voters (48 percent) did not believe Denmark lives up to its obligations. And this impression is largely independent of political affiliation, at least the connection was not great, and there was little connection with attitude toward our NATO membership either. This feeling can thus be said to be relatively relaxed.

"The objective of NATO planning for Denmark is to have a Danish defense that is strong enough to repel an attack long enough so that help from our NATO allies can reach us. Some people say this is not possible. What do you think, do you think this kind of temporary Danish defense is possible or do you think it is not possible?"

	Yes	No	Don't know	Total
Total	19	56	25	100
To right of Soc Democrats	31	50	19	100
Social Democrats	16	59	25	100
To left of Soc Democrats	8	77	15	100
For NATO	29	56	15	100
Against NATO	9	77	14	100
Don't know	7	39	54	100
Those believing we meet our obligations	25	61	14	100
Those believing we do not meet our obligations	23	65	12	100
Don't know	8	38	54	100

The response is striking. A clear majority of the voters (56 percent) did not believe in the value of a Danish defense in a war situation even one that is simply designed to hold out until help arrives. The belief that this could make a difference depends on political affiliation, attitude toward NATO and willingness to expand defense but regardless of affiliation and attitude most of the voters in all groups felt that a Danish defense is impossible.

At this point the central question was asked:

"If Denmark does not reach the goal set for it should we appropriate the money needed to reach the goal or should we adapt our defense to the money we have and not appropriate more?" The following answers were given:

	More money	Same amount	Don't know	Total
Total	30	44	26	100
To right of Soc Democrats	53	29	18	100
Social Democrats	21	50	29	100
To left of Soc Democrats	10	76	14	100

	More money	Same amount	Don't know	Total
For NATO	52	34	14	100
Against NATO	3	83	14	100
Don't know	8	31	61	100
Those believing we meet our obligations	27	57	16	100
Those believing we do not meet our obligations	43	47	10	100
Don't know	11	27	62	100
Defense possible	37	52	11	100
Defense impossible	13	75	12	100
Don't know	8	29	63	100

As we can see only a third of the voters (30 percent) were prepared to pay for meeting our obligations and almost half (44 percent) actually opposed doing so. Here political affiliation played an important role. A majority of voters to the right of the Social Democrats (53 percent) felt we should meet our obligations while the majority of other voters held the opposite opinion.

Thus it is striking that while a majority of Social Democratic voters favor our NATO cooperation a majority of the same voters oppose the idea of meeting our obligations.

It can further be seen that even among NATO supporters "only" 52 percent were prepared to live up to our obligations and a third (34 percent) directly opposed doing so. It is also striking that a relative majority and almost half (47 percent) of the voters who felt Denmark does not meet its obligations did not think we should appropriate more money.

Finally it can be seen that the concept of our ability to defend ourselves is very important. Three times as many voters who feel "it does some good" (37 percent) as those who felt it is useless (13 percent) were prepared to appropriate more money.

It may seem strange and paradoxical that Danish voters clearly support our NATO cooperation while at the same time they object to meeting our obligations to this cooperation. The most obvious explanation of this apparent paradox is probably one substantiated by earlier surveys made by the Gallup Institute on this question, that the voters view the true protection as being the American "nuclear umbrella" or the balance of terror while they do not believe in the possibilities of traditional defense, at least not in Denmark.

The government has brought aid to developing countries into the picture by saying that a choice might be necessary between such aid and defense, so we asked the following question.

"If Denmark can't afford to fund both adequately, which do you think is more important, funding defense spending or funding aid to developing countries?"

These answers were given:

	Defense	Develop- ment aid	Don't know	Total
Total	32	37	31	100
To right of Social Democrats	46	27	27	100
Social Democrats	30	39	31	100
To left of Social Democrats	10	67	23	100
For NATO	47	30	23	100
Against NATO	12	63	23	100
Don't know	16	30	54	100

As we see increased funding for aid to developing countries has more support than increased defense funding although the difference is not great. At the same time a little less than a third of the voters (31 percent) could not decide on priorities here or felt they had nothing to do with each other.

Only bourgeois voters felt defense should have top priority as did supporters of NATO membership.

The final conclusion is that most people want American protection via NATO membership but they have no faith in a Danish defense and consequently don't want to expand it regardless of whether or not they believe we are meeting our obligations. And a more detailed analysis of the figures showed that an inclination to feel we should increase defense appropriations had more to do with a belief that this would accomplish something than with a feeling that we should live up to our obligations for the sake of decency although both factors were important to those inclined to provide more funding. Finally, we found that opponents of NATO membership are impervious to both these arguments.

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6578

CSO: 3106

CONSERVATIVES' FOLKETING LEADER SCHLÜTER REACHES FIFTY

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 1 Apr 79 2d Sec p 7

[Article by Harry Rasmussen]

[Text] Poul Schlüter is so cute and good-looking that some say that precisely those youthful good looks have been his problem--which, of course, is not right. Such a thing is automatically taken care of by age...if you have patience. As Schlüter perhaps hasn't, usually, in other connections.

Now he will be 50 years old on Tuesday [3 April 1979], and he has set youth records all his life (KU'er [member of the Christian People's Party youth organization] in his school days, division chairman at 16, national chairman at 23, and the then youngest Folketing candidate ever at 24). Now he is the most youthful 50-year-old, and the Folketing is honoring him with a reception from 10 to 12 Tuesday in the Landsting hall, which once sheltered the relics of a privileged electorate.

Ideal of a Conservative

When journalist Malin Lindgren wanted to needle Poul Schlüter in a nice way--first in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE and then in POLITIKEN--he resorted to the description, "He is the type that fits into haberdashery and breakfast food advertisements. Eat corn flakes or be conservative to have a good family life; it apparently comes to the same thing."

Schlüter not only is conservative, he simply has to be the ideal of a conservative. He comes from a wholesaler's home with a piano. And a wholesaler's home in Tønder at that... even though he was born 9 years after the reunification. And he himself plays so well on the piano that he could have made a career in that field if he had not become a lawyer with the right to plead before the supreme court--and a politician.

What he did not become is mayor of Gladsaxe, where in his time he was chosen as Erhard Jacobsen's Conservative counterpart. Today that sounds odd.

On the other hand, he did become the Conservatives' deliverer. He entered the Folketing in 1964, and in 1974, when the Conservative leaders were either dead or engaged in forcing the "unhappy triangle" (as Knud Secher calls the party's traditional triumvirate) into irreconcilable disunity, Schlüter became both national chairman and chairman of the party's Folketing delegation.

He became the party boss, and with his slogan "Bourgeois voters who work" he created new confidence in the party externally--and peace internally.

That was what was needed, and even though there were still 22 seats lacking to reach the 1968 peak of 37 seats, Schlüter reversed a party situation.

Schlüter-Sørensen

Poul Schlüter has not been so willing to collaborate with the Social Democrats, but he has now and then supported a compromise. That, too, put wind in his sails. He was more hesitant during the Liberals' leadership crisis. He clearly had no desire to take AKTUELT's well-meant advice to become the Conservatives' new Poul Sørensen, with powerful influence as leader of the opposition. In any case Schlüter did nothing right on that occasion.

What he dreamed of in the bottom of his heart is no secret. As early as 1965 he raised the question, "Why not be guided by the great prospects that a united party opens up?" and he was thinking of the VK [Liberal-Conservative] idea that Erik Eriksen, among others, had broken his neck on.

In 1965 Schlüter was very young, but he actually repeated his idea last year--on the radio on Saturday of Whitsun-week--straight out and without a blush:

"I will not conceal the fact that since my youth I have been a warm advocate of the Conservatives' and the Liberals' being united in one party."

And he dreamed a catastrophic little extra dream: "Partly because it is a little bit accidental whether the voters vote for the Liberals or for the Conservative People's Party..."

But then the new party chairman, Ib Stetter, came in and extinguished all untimely youthful dreams in a politically complicated time.

Opposition

Schlüter's party ambitions are clear enough--a united bourgeois opposition--and so it vexes him that the Liberals are sitting dangling their feet from the high ministerial stools.

Schlüter must fight with the Conservatives--against the Progressive Party, which has snatched away his voters. And fight well for his side. He rejected Glistrup as a member of the government, for example, with the words, "We cannot have a man who sits on a ministerial bench one day and the bench of the municipal court the next."

No wavering. But when the Liberals left the two-party, three-party, and four-party bourgeois coalition, Schlüter really found himself somewhat deserted with his 15-man delegation and a not very reliable bourgeois back-up.

Nobody is really calling for him at the moment. There are no real demands for the sportsman in him... He has a ten-speed racing bicycle and a motor cruiser, has been Jutland champion in the pentathlon, and is an alpine down-hill skier and a good golfer. Last year he abandoned all that, and he told two journalists that he would quit politics when he reached 50... That was a mistake. He meant 60, but it came near creating panic among the Conservatives. For obviously they cannot do without him. And the opponents both like him and respect him.

COMMUNIST PARTIES ISSUE JOINT STATEMENT AFTER MEETING

Paris CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME in French Sep 80 pp 123-125

[Joint statement by the communist parties of France, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Reunion, issued in Paris on 1 July 1980]

[Text] Delegations from the communist parties of France, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Reunion, headed by their respective secretaries general, Georges Marchais, Guy Daninthe, Armand Nicolas, and Paul Verges,* met in Paris on 1 July 1980. The delegations engaged in a wide-ranging exchange of views on the situation in their countries and on the prospects for militant action. This meeting also gave them the opportunity to reaffirm their combat solidarity.

The four parties denounce the reactionary policy of the French Government and its UDF-RPR [Union for French Democracy-Rally for the Republic] majority subservient to the monopolies. The government and major employers want to make the working masses in France bear the burden of the economic crisis, and in the overseas departments, they want to perpetuate and aggravate colonial domination with its disastrous consequences.

The four parties underscore the extreme gravity of the situation in these islands.

The government's policy has resulted in a slump in agricultural production, a reduction or liquidation of the already weak industrial sector, and a decline in fisheries and native arts and crafts.

*For the French Communist Party: Maxime Gremetz, secretary of the Central Committee (CC), and Jean-Charles Negre, assistant to the CC's foreign policy section. For the Guadeloupe Communist Party: Ernest Moutoussamy, member of the political bureau, and Michel Bangou, member of the CC. For the Martinique Communist Party: Guy Dufond, member of the political bureau. For the Reunion Communist Party: Julien Ramin, secretary of the Central Committee.

The various government plans end in setbacks for these countries, because their real purpose is to allow monopolies to make excessive profits. These monopolies are interested in these countries as consumer markets supported by public funds, as reserves of rich marine resources, and as strategic commercial and military bases.

The human consequences of this policy are tragic.

Half the population is unemployed. There is widespread underemployment among women. Two-thirds of the youth are deprived of job opportunities. The continuous increase in prices and taxes is systematically reducing the purchasing power of workers, and small and medium-size farmers. A growing number of men and women are being plunged into abject poverty in these countries.

The very existence of these peoples in the near future is threatened by a policy of intensive emigration of their young men and women at a time when the birthrate is declining sharply. This danger is exacerbated by mounting immigration designed to change the composition of the population.

In France, natives of the DOM's [overseas departments] are subjected to capitalist exploitation and to discrimination of every kind, including racism.

To maintain its system, French imperialism is reinforcing its administrative staffs, its military presence, and its repressive forces. Arbitrariness, discrimination, violation of human rights, and brutal repression are increasingly becoming the rule in these colonies.

Despite the scheming government's use of economic assistance as hush money to deter popular protest, despite its powerful propaganda means, particularly [television channel] FR3, and despite its virulent anticommunism, the working masses refuse to be brainwashed and are becoming more and more rapidly aware of the colonial character of the integration policy, extending today to the Common Market's Europe.

The peoples of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Reunion, as well as those of Guiana, New Caledonia, and Polynesia, are victims of colonialist contempt expressed in a variety of forms. The refusal to recognize their national identity, more and more widely resented here and there, the denial of their cultural originality, are combined with arbitrary actions, rigged elections, and violation of their dignity.

An increasingly large number of the social classes in these countries are joining the struggle and becoming conscious of the colonial reality of their situation. The policy of humiliation and depersonalization is being increasingly denounced. The struggles for dignity are expanding. Peoples are openly asserting their individuality more and more frequently. There is growing national consciousness, especially in the Antilles, and this despite the Socialist Party which denies the right of self-determination to the peoples of the DOM's and thereby reinforces the RPR-Giscardian coalition.

Communists play a large and leading part in developing those multiform militant campaigns that have recently scored noteworthy successes.

Peoples of the DOM's are insisting, with increasing vigor, upon their right to be given responsibility for management of their own affairs.

The four parties reaffirm the inalienable right of these peoples to freely choose their status and determine their own future.

The French Communist Party is working to see that the inviolable right of self-determination of the DOM peoples is respected. In league with those peoples, the party is striving to create democratic conditions guaranteeing the the free exercise of that right.

The communist parties of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Reunion determine their own policy altogether independently and according to conditions peculiar to each of their countries.

It is on this basis that each of these parties offers its people a political status that puts an end to the situation of colonial domination and permits economic development, social progress, and cultural fulfillment in freedom while advancing to socialism.

While it is true that each people has its own particular social-historical development, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Reunion cannot remain outside the current development in the Caribbean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The upsurge in people's struggles in these regions and the progress of anti-imperialist forces are reviving the sense of their dignity and the necessary international solidarity in opposition to the reinforcement of the forces of French and American imperialisms.

The four parties stressed the importance of coordinating the militant campaigns of DOM workers with those campaigns being waged by all French workers against the policy of repression, austerity, unemployment, and colonial pillage pursued by large multinational corporations and the Giscardian government.

As part of this coordinated action, the French Communist Party will intensify its efforts to support the campaigns of DOM workers to obtain satisfaction of their demands for enforcement of their economic and social rights, for respect and extension of freedoms and democracy.

The French Communist Party reaffirms its solidarity with the struggles of the peoples and communist parties of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Reunion to free themselves from colonialism.

These three parties support the French Communist Party's action designed to put an end to domination by big capitalist interests.

At the end of these talks conducted in an atmosphere of cordiality and frankness, the four parties agreed to strengthen their fraternal cooperation and active solidarity.

UNCOORDINATED MINISTERIAL ACTIVITIES WEAKENING GOVERNMENT

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 28 Sep 80 pp 2, 3

[Article by Nikh. Dimitriou: "This Government Does Not Function..."]

[Text] Major opposition leader A. Papandreou has characterized the Rallis government as a "summer vacation" one. But the vacations are over...and the picture the New Democracy Party presents both as a party and a government is one that indeed... reminds us of the scene from the play, "The Swinging Stars."

From their [ministry] fortress, the ministers "resolve and order" whatever they think without any prior consultation with their colleagues. Each party cadre plays his own game aiming at broadening his influence or at mortgaging, through favors, the voters for the future. The premier and leader of the New Democracy Party maintains for himself the role of "supreme overseer" and "fireman" of controversies. The vice-premier--many say--has assumed one and only one responsibility: to hold audiences and to satisfy the favors asked by deputies, without showing any intention of cooperating with the premier.

"If we continue the way we are today, it will not be long before everybody becomes arrogantly independent and then we will rot," say those who feel that Rallis has thus far failed to control the party and the government cadres as much as he should. The premier's thinking seems to be: "Let us cope until the elections without any problems between us and then we shall see."

On the other side of the coin--in the area of the opposition--the bickering between the Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK] and KKE about the "agent of change" continues unabated as do the crossfires of the smaller parties and groups on how best to plan the struggle for taking the power away from the Right.

The "scenarios" enunciated--and proclaimed--until now, 3 years after the last elections, have not changed substantially while the margins for unity among the progressive forces have become extremely narrow... The following analysis is an attempt to describe the "political landscape" following the summer vacations, the arrangements and developments taking place within the country's political forces as we enter the last winter before the elections...

This Government Does not Function...

The saying that the main problem of the Rallis government is the government itself has been confirmed in recent days not only by the Averof-Mitsotakis public

confrontation (during which their "undermining remarks" were accompanied by civilities about each other's gallant motives) but also by the initiatives of ministers which give the impression of having "personal chieftainships." In its frequent comments the press in supporting the government claims that the differences in existing or expressed views reflect democratic contrasts of opinion, interparty plural views, and European political character.

Undoubtedly, if it is an exaggeration to describe each difference of opinion and ministerial dispute as divisive, then the assurances about "pluralism of views" are but an oversimplification. The question is not that the ministers disagree between themselves but that they refuse to openly discuss their disputes which their colleagues learn about from the newspapers. Examples:

a. Communications Minister Papagiorgopoulos announces the installation of diesel engines in all cars as of October, while his more qualified colleagues announce that such installation will be limited.

b. Agriculture Minister Kanellopoulos meets with commercial attaches of foreign countries and reaches agreements providing the sale of soft wheat in exchange for agricultural machinery, and so forth. The next day Commerce Minister Minas says that there are no available quantities of such wheat which, moreover, was sold at good foreign exchange prices.

c. Two of the four government cadres in the Communications Ministry and specifically Kondogiorgis and Palaiokrassas refuse to approve regulations introduced arbitrarily by other colleagues through a draft law under their jurisdiction and they advertise their refusal in the Chamber of Deputies.

d. Interior Minister Stratos proclaims publicly that he aims at renewing the institution of the "fixed term" for nomarchs (regardless of criteria and motives) and the introduction of the institution of recallable nomarchs. Without any previous consultation he presents his decision to the Government Committee, most members of which are taken by surprise. Finally, Stratos cancels his decisions and reappoints all nomarchs, even those whom the Evaluation Council had judged incompetent.

The examples are inexhaustible. Already, Minister to the Premier K. Stefanopoulos has admitted in the Chamber of Deputies on 18 June that many of the draft laws introduced by ministers are incomplete and vague. They are being voted, in other words, when other ministers do not know what the impact of such laws will be.

Ironically speaking, one could say that in this respect the Rallis government could not be different from the previous one whose policies, as he says, are being continued. Yet the differences in motives are substantial.

Reproduction of Arbitrariness

The tendencies for "personal chieftainships" within the New Democracy government until the middle of last March, as well as the public controversies and the mutual surprises in the decision-making process, are due mainly to the transitive character of that government as a result of the anticipated assumption of the presidency by K. Karamanlis. This phenomenon augmented the interparty feuds about the succession

to the premiership and the party leadership, as well as about the legitimate or supercilious ambitions of certain ministers who maliciously waited for the floundering of other ministers.

A third element of the disintegrating picture was lack of cooperation and the fact that each minister had as a criterion for his "activities" the degree of goodwill on the part of the premier toward such activity. "Let others say what they want; I am protected," was the usual answer which indicated the career politician's mentality based on government paternalism. How does the Rallis government reproduce these phenomena of "arbitrariness" by its ministers?

First of all, the present government is a product of compromises following the nearly tie vote [for the party leadership] in the Parliamentary Group--an outcome which today is considered as having changed considerably, actually to a point where suggestions are being made to Rallis for a reshuffle of the government. But as long as Rallis does not consider such reshuffling expedient, certain "Rallis die-hards" will not reconcile themselves to the notion of coexistence with ministers and deputy ministers who undermine the government, its plans, and its future.

But if Rallis appears determined to live with the government of "compromise" he formed 4 months ago, his policy of "indulgence" does not seem to create enthusiasm among certain Rallis "die-hard" ministers whenever such policy is implemented by government as a whole.

"Some of them are not afraid of the premier," say the admirers of the view for a "more dynamic" supervision by Rallis who today prefers the role of a "stabilizer" for the problems created by the "personal chieftainships." Others say that Rallis' main strategy is "to cope until the election, without any problems between us and then we will see." Still others speak about the danger of a party split and of more disputes on policies different than the present ones.

We Will Talk After the Elections

But there are those among the most disappointed who point out that Rallis is not yet "fully conscious of the power his position and his undisputed devotion to the government and the party afford him." They cannot understand why he cannot bring about changes in the Greek Radio and Television [ERT] and the Armed Forces Information Service [YENED] both of which are against him. These, moreover, are the ones who fear that "if we continue the way we are today it will not be long before everybody becomes arrogantly independent and we will then rot" and who argue that Rallis cannot succeed in his chosen role of "supreme overseer" and "fireman" of controversies and ambitions.

"Even Karamanlis with his stature failed in this role," they point out. Such tactics of course intensify the discontent about the poor (for 6-7 years) administration of organizations, enterprises and institutions; about the phenomenon of one person holding many positions; about gerontocracy, and so forth. Another related oddity is the systematic effort to take away from government control certain policy sectors (such as the Ministry of Civilization) while blaming the government for decisions having negative impact.

On the other hand, while at Rallis' order the case of the "pink diplomas" has been terminated, Papadongonas is one of the few deputies who systematically refuses any contact with the leader of his party and appears to plan and to propagandize about anything except the benefits of party unity.

But regardless of the above assessments, the fact remains that the premier submits to the "veto" of certain ministers despite the fact that he is of a different opinion. Two such cases occurred in his recent dealings with Coordination Minister Boutsos. Relevant rumors spread and articles were published with serious consequences.

In an article in the NEW YORK TIMES last Wednesday, Nicolas Gage (a Greek-American of Ipirotan descent) points out that certain political advisors are telling Averof to avoid initiating any action "because the more Rallis holds the premiership the more it will become apparent that he is not a very strong leader."

Those who believe in the Rallis leadership and qualifications as well as in the prospect that "we will see after the elections" are not objective in their assessment even though their arguments are valid. Thus, one must admit that the policy of the "mild political climate," as well as the skillful attracting to his side of many "anti-Rallis" deputies and his presently unquestionable leadership, brought Rallis more benefits than one could anticipate 3 or 4 months ago. An improvised review of events proves it: All rumors and possibilities about inter-party troubles in the Chamber of Deputies and in the party itself, about party splitting intentions thus strengthening the extreme Right, about the complete failure of economic plans and about "a hot opposition summer" proved to be, if anything, fictitious.

In addition, judging from the public enmities between the government and the major opposition on 24 July and early September, one can point out that the "mild political climate" (even though it does not represent a Rallis political strategy) is not really a matter of the past and that, on the contrary, a polite attitude continues to characterize the government-PASOK relations notwithstanding the strong differences between the two. From all points of view this "truce" is considered to be beneficial to Rallis. First of all, he enjoys a personal immunity, as far as his intentions are concerned, among many followers of the opposition and he is accepted in a broader spectrum than the one of his political party. This of course is a Rallis accomplishment which matches those of the charismatic Karamanlis. This and other similar accomplishments, however, are not sufficient in implementing a difficult government policy (if one exists). But let us analyze the situation more systematically through the persons who run the government and who harbor anything but gentle intentions for the present and the future.

Persons and...Events

In foreign affairs there is, contrary to the premier's thinking, the Mitsotakis "euphoria" and his rumored discension with the Foreign Ministry establishment (which is thought to be controlled by Mitsos and Molyviatis) with still undetermined developments and consequences.

There is stagnancy in foreign matters, especially as they concern the question of the American bases and NATO. If one bears in mind that if the Turkish militarists do not give in soon and if the Rallis government remains firm in its promises

then the question of removing the American bases will come up. Thus, the shock will be maximized and may prove the present "unity" superficial.

Everyone considers Coordination Minister Giannis Boutsas a competent technocrat but according to first assessments the first problems concerning cooperation and interparty complaints have already made their appearance. It is said that his irascible character has displeased many deputies "because he never comes to the phone." It is also said that the coordination problems of the government policy (which, moreover, is not based on any program) are multiplying because he is forced to spend only a few hours in the Ministry of Coordination.

The economic policy of the Rallis government has been characterized by [Ministers] Boutsas and Evert as "very liberal." But it has not yet been admitted--as V. Paikos has pointed out--that this policy is strengthening large capital.

One cannot conceive that this policy, which characterizes all government decisions--from the attracting of investments to the demands of the shipowners and from the new loan conveniences to the privileged treatment of the large technical companies as concerns their debts to the insurance funds (which amount to 9 billion drachmas)--can be combined with truly popular measures without destroying the country's economy. When one wants to satisfy all, in the end one displeases all, says an authority on economic matters. Moreover, as concerns the disagreements about the plans for the modernization of the banking system, the FINANCIAL TIMES warns that the plans cannot be implemented without imposing hardships on the banking establishment. Also, the framework for the necessary modernization which the entrance of Greece into EEC requires, the need for an investment policy, and the stagnant inflation at 25 percent constitute hardships for the whole banking machinery. The necessary changes entail unsympathetic decisions no one is disposed to make. Thus, decisions and problems remain, such as are the poor functioning of the state machinery, the lack of planning, the real nature of the "liberal policy," and also the so-called "camouflaged" issues of harmonious cooperation--issues which exist on a much broader scale than a mere disagreement of views shows. For example, one can cite the leadership of the Hellenic Industrial Development bank, the Bank of Greece and, to a lesser degree, to the National Bank [of Greece].

In the farming sector, besides the known dispute between the minister of agriculture and the leadership of the Agricultural Bank of Greece the "showcase initiatives" by agrarian deputies aim at adopting measures and plans which will facilitate the "repatriation" of the farmers who voted PASOK in 1977.

In the public administration sector complacency and favoritism have continued in such a scandalous manner that in recent civil service tests most of the successful participants have been compatriots of [Minister] Stamatis from the village of Kataranga. Fifteen other fellow villagers were appointed in the same ministry without examination (or alibis). Vice-Premier K. Papakonstandinou who heads the public administration sector seldom goes to the premier's office for consultation with the result that Premier Rallis is forced to go to his office. Recently, moreover, Papakonstandinou is reported to be complaining more and more against certain ministers and that his duties in the public administration sector are limited to holding audiences and to satisfying the requests for favors by many deputies. There are, of course, many ministers and secretaries general who are updating Papakonstandinou on various programs but this does not mean that there is coordination or advance consultation and cooperation.

Next to [Minister] Dimas, Konst. Stefanopoulos is said to be under the direct influence of the vice-premier. In the past 3 years his performance in all the ministries he served including the ministry to the premier has been mediocre. However, he enjoys great appeal among the organized followers of the party even though his social connections are poor as are his relations with the press.

"He is the showman at congresses," remarks one of his colleagues spitefully, referring to the rightist and old-fashioned rhetorical skill of Stefanopoulos who recently is being characterized as "the mellifluous nightingale of our party," regardless of any interpretation one may give to such characterization.

In the industry sector, [Minister] Stefanos Manos has regular political contacts with his colleagues not only because of government requirements but also for his own political benefit. The view that Manos has good but unenforceable ideas and therefore lacks "political sensitivity" is the most charitable interparty accusation against him not to mention the problems he created recently such as, for instance, his differences with [Ministers] Koutsos, St. Dimas, and the Public Power Corporation leadership.

Deputy Communication Minister Koutsios who seems to be among those of the "Kallis followers" trying to gain good relations with Averof, is playing his own political game. The general disorganization he has imposed on the Greek Telecommunications Organization and the Greek Posts [ELTA] in order to boost his ambitions (it is said that he flirts with the idea of becoming minister of agriculture) reached the point of "caving down" decisions for [salary and wage] increases or ELTA skillfully planned strike activities. The Koutsios case (which is not the only one) stresses the need for Kallis to show greater determination.

Ministers St. Dimas, G. Papagiorgopoulos, Io. Palaiochrassas, and some other senior officials with political ambitions much greater than their present qualifications have not exhibited any initiatives of decisive political policy. The same is true in the case of Christ. Stratos who lately seems to be renewing his relations with "Averof followers" and tries to make his ministerial presence more noticeable (representations against Mitsotakis). According to his critics, Stratos does not have any chance to realize his ambition: "I entered politics to become, like a cadet [has an ambition] to become, chief of the armed forces." It is said that besides the problem of his health, Stratos is recently occupied very much with [King] Konstantinos' decision not to rely on him anymore in the future.

Stratos is the leader of a group of five or six deputies and is considered to be the type of industrialist who can be successful in everything but who (despite the boasting of his followers) will not succeed in becoming premier. His interparty opponents nicknamed him "J. R." after certain characteristics of the star in the TV soap opera "Dallas."

Minister of Economic Mitilathis Evert appears to have luck on his side and particularly in his present post since, as is said, "the reaction on the measures [he pro] posed concerning tax reductions was rather favorable even though no one understood them." Evert, who is considered to be "flesh and blood of the Right," has decided to follow for himself the old-fashioned "dynamic" leadership model (he has about the same manners as Karamanlis and Kallis when they were young) while using at the same time his lieutenants who do more than just serve him.

Using Kk. Karamanlis as his leverage, Averof does not get involved in interparty disputes which are beyond his ambitions. But his recent disagreements with Stefanopoulos and others concerning the Youth Organisation of the New Democracy Party and the leadership of the party machine are not devoid of problems nor are they inconsequential.

Averof's Future Stand

The question of interparty relations with Avg. Averof as the epicenter needs broader investigation. The Averof problem is two-faceted. On the one hand, there is bitterness and surprise for the "unexpected" result of the party electing Rallis as its leader, and on the other hand, there exist the pressures of the "hard core" (who do not exceed 1%) concerned mainly for their own personal fates. Without doubt Averof is sincere in his assurances that he does not want to create a split or cause resignations from the party except in the case of a possible disagreement on very important matters of principle.

For this reason he has not consented to certain recommendations such as touring the provinces for the purpose of exposing the interparty differences and causing the fall of Rallis "from within." Yet, as election time approaches, the pressures continue to exist, particularly because most of these "hard core" (despite the fact that some of them are of dignified stature) were elected in 1977 by the fewest votes.

The view that Averof will remain in the party until the day after election day gains all the more supporters for him since, as is known, many leaders have expressed the opinion (and the recommendation) that any split in the New Democracy Party before the elections will give PASOK first place thus affording it (regardless of vote percentages) the chance to form a government--bringing it, that is, to power. It is for this reason, moreover, that Karamanlis is reported to have asked former President of the Republic Tsatsos' opinion on such a possible development (which Karamanlis opposes under such circumstances).

The tactic of "pass the time until the election without problems"--despite the fact that such a course has an impact on the Rallis leadership--was followed faithfully even during the recent Averof-Mitsotakis dispute in which the first did not take a public stand. Rallis has reprimanded Mitsotakis with "why do you needle and irritate Averof?" According to reliable sources in the Rallis environment, the premier has decided that no interparty cause should provide Defense Minister Averof with the alibi of resigning from the party as he so often hints at during all of his public pronouncements about his "loyal differences with the Rallis policy" (interviews, statements, talks).

It is evident that this "fire extinguishing" tactic of Premier Rallis (which is combined, moreover, with his identity as a "super-overseer" without important close colleagues except those who were with him in his capacity as minister) cannot lead to some decisive solution of the country's problems nor those of the government. Thus, the responsibility of success or failure belongs exclusively to Rallis himself who will be the first one to be shaken from the position of "stabilizer" which he continues to prefer today.

EEC RELATIONS WITH PASOK PARTY IMPROVE

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 18 Sep 80 pp 25,26

[Text] Brussels, September--The Community's position as regards PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] is changing with the conviction that the party's position as regards the EEC is also changing. According to information from Brussels, the attitude and estimation of community factors regarding the party of official opposition (PASOK) have significantly changed in recent months, following the initiatives developed by PASOK in the European area. PASOK's rapprochement to its kindred European parties (social-democratic), its decision to actively participate in the European Parliament among the ranks of the socialist group (a related letter was sent to the leader of the group, Glyn), Andreas Papandreou's statement that he will support Spain's entry into the Community, and the recent meeting of socialist leaders from the Mediterranean countries in Kerkyra were events which have contributed to the change in Community officials' attitude and estimation as regards the party.

More specifically, these officials do not now believe that a possible PASOK ascension to power represents a danger for EEC cohesion or Greece's participation in the EEC. The change which has been noted is clearly evident in discussions with Community officials. Contrary to whatever has happened in the past, Community officials now think that Andreas Papandreou wants Greece's active participation in the Community, "perhaps because he understands that he can better apply his program within the Community framework," stressed a senior Community official in a discussion.

So the Community officials do not now believe that Papandreou will try to organize a referendum on whether or not Greece will stay in the Community. (At any rate, conducting a referendum is one of the powers of the president, Karanalis.) To the contrary, Community officials are beginning to orient themselves to the idea of a PASOK government renegotiating certain regulations of the Act of Accession (according to the British model). It seems that they consider unavoidable a renegotiated "formula" which will allow PASOK to satisfy its dynamic voters whom it "fed" until recently with promises about a future departure from the Community which certain of its cadres depicted in black colors.

In any case, the Community is absolutely aware of the internal tendencies prevailing in PASOK relative to the party's "European policy." It knows, more particularly, that a group of "intensely ideologically oriented" cadres and adherents "rejects" the Community reality and wants Greece's exit from it (Editor's Note: Recent

events in Salonica--expulsion of members from the monarchy committee--even if they are considered marginal, verify this viewpoint).

In any case, it must be stressed that, independent of Community estimations regarding PASOK, PASOK President A. Papandreu proclaimed in a speech at the youth festival that: "It has always been a position of PASOK that the entry of our country into the EEC is an error of the first magnitude. That our industry will be irreparably hurt. That our country's open air, agricultural Greece, will be devastated. That it will become very difficult--if not impossible--for us to program a self-powered development of Greece. In place of accession, we propose a special agreement of the type recently granted by the EEC to neighboring Yugoslavia, an agreement which will allow us to control our foreign trade and the movement of capital.

"It has always been a position of PASOK that the people must be called to decide--in the frameworks of a genuine referendum--between accession and the special agreement. It has always been a position of PASOK that--as long as we are in the ranks of the EEC--we must participate in all the Community organs. We must wage a hand-to-hand battle for the interests of Greece, we must minimize the damage, we must safeguard the interests of workers in our country and we must coordinate our action with Europeans from the south."

Independent of all these, the fact is--as O OIKONOMIKOS TAXHYDROMOS first wrote--that the Community does not want elections carried out in Greece before the formal completion of procedures for accession of our country into the Community, that is, before 1 January 1981. We are glad that certain political newspapers have also finally revealed what O OIKONOMIKOS TAXHYDROMOS has written repeatedly since May.

EEC Agreement With Cyprus

After a long period of indecisiveness, it appears that negotiations for application of the second stage of the EEC-Cyprus association agreement will begin shortly. The European Committee has already approved the general proposals for the second stage which it submitted to the Council of Ministers. After the related study, the Council must issue an "order" to the Committee to start negotiations.

The EEC-Cyprus association agreement was signed in December 1972 and went into effect in July 1973. One purpose of the agreement is to create a tariff union between the two sides in two stages. The first stage is of five-years duration. By contract, it ended on 1 July 1977, when application of the second stage would begin. In the first stage, the Community granted tariff decreases for Cypriot exports of industrial and agricultural products. In the second stage, application of the tariff union would proceed. However, the Community decided that application of the second stage would not proceed after the Turkish invasion on the island and the situation which prevailed. Consequently, the first stage was extended until the present. Certain pending issues were regulated with the signature of four additional protocols.

A firm request of the Cypriot Government was application of the second stage, that is, the start of procedures to create the tariff union. The proposals which the Committee submitted to the Council provide for development of the second stage in two phases, the first of which will be of three-years duration. The Cypriot side wants entry into the second phase (of the second stage) to happen automatically,

that is, without preceding negotiations. It appears that the Community did not accept this request. Another issue which will occupy the negotiations applies to Cypriot agricultural exports to the Community.

Employees in Community Organs

Not unrelated, half-learned and semi-educated: The "second installment" of Greek senior employees hired by Community organs (Committee, Parliament, Council) will be heard soon. Since many things are being heard and more are being rumored, we want to attract the attention of the appropriate Community factors. The criteria for selection will have to be completely meritocratic. The unrelated, half-learned or semi-educated persons who the Greek side probably wants to impose will have to be excluded. Service done as a favor must not be extended to a European level. Only the capability, talents and activity of the candidate must be taken into account. In positions for which a knowledge of European issues is required things are probably easier because people in Greece who know about European affairs are more or less well-known. The others are the paratroopers who follow the principle "in Greece you are what you declare."

We are writing these things in order to protect the good image of Greece in the Community. We believe, moreover, that the accession must be a factor for eradication of wrongful habits, not their perpetuation.

Judge on European Tribunal

The European Tribunal is overburdened with the volume of continually increasing work. Its principal task is to interpret and apply Community law, but this work often presupposes the interpretation and knowledge of national laws also.

Therefore, the Greek judge in Luxembourg must combine: an excellent knowledge of Community law because he will not have time to learn it in Luxembourg; an excellent knowledge of Greek law because his fellow judges will consult with him on matters of Greek law; exceptional diligence and efficiency in order to be able to cope with the large volume of work; exceptional knowledge of languages since conducting of a case occurs, as a rule, in the language of the plaintiff or the referring court, therefore in different languages (given that approximately half of the cases are conducted in German, our judge must be well familiarized with not only English and French, but also German); and recognition and prestige in Community circles. So the government must, before formally proposing the name of the Greek judge, proceed in unofficial contacts with the governments of the Nine.

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LEGISLATION FOR SUBWAY EXTENSION APPROVED

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek 15 Sep-1 Oct 80 p 21

[Article by K. Tsouparopoulos: "Will Construction of the Metro Finally Begin in 1981?"]

[Text] The Athens "Metro"—which is a dire necessity—has been timely for years without even beginning to be constructed. Last week, it was again at the center of interest with the passage of the related draft law in the Chamber of Deputies and it revived the hopes and dreams of Athenians.

Minister of Communications G. Panagiotopoulos stated:

1. Construction of trial tunnels and shafts will begin in the fall of 1980, as will procedures for expropriation of the sites through which the Metro will pass.
2. At the end of 1980 to beginning of 1981, the French association will have handed over the preliminary study of the two lines, A (Aigaleo-Gerakas) and B (Dafni-Sepolia).
3. Beginning at the same time will be building studies and composing of the solicitation for bids on the B Line—which has been characterized as of first priority--so that its construction will begin within 1981, the goal being its completion in three to four years, that is, by 1985.
4. Line A (Aigaleo-Gerakas) will begin to be built in 1984 and it is expected to be operating by 1990. Its extension up to the new International Airfield at Spata is expected in the future.

This time chart will be applied "as long as there is a normal and unhindered financing of the project."

Will it happen? Unfortunately, this is not a perceptible prospect, given the government's policy for decrease and strict restriction of the liquidity of money and public expenditures. Indicative of this, it is reported that there has not yet been approval of the credits for expropriation of the sites where the Metro ventilation shafts will open. The possibilities of financing the project appear even smaller if it is considered that construction of the new airfield will begin at the same time as Metro with at least an equal cost.

The successive governmental decisions for restriction of the system are most probably owing to economic difficulties. Thus, of the five lines originally planned, they have been restricted to the following two: Line A: Aigaleo-Iera Odos-Syndagma-Ethnikos Kipos [National Gardens]-Vas. Sofias-Soutsou-Panormou-Erythros Stavros-Gerakas (length of 19 kilometers) and Line B: Dafni (Kyprou Square)-Ag. Ioannis-Syngrou-Vas. Amalias-Panepistimiou-Omonoia-Ag. Konstandinou-Deligianni-OSE [Railways Organization of Greece] Station-Plat. Attikis-Sepalia (length of 9.5 kilometers).

But what is the cost of Metro and how will it be covered? Estimates made by appropriate factors raise the present cost to 100 billion drachmas. If, as was planned, its construction had begun in 1974, it would have cost 12 billion drachmas, in 1978 23 billion drachmas and in 1979 43 billion drachmas. As was stressed in the Chamber, it is not excluded that the cost may become prohibitive if another one to two years is allowed to pass.

According to the government position, only those Athenians interested and benefited will be called to pay for the cost of the project. More specifically, large specialized companies or organizations from abroad who will undertake covering the cost of the project will be invited to declare building interest. The government will impose taxation and the income from the tax will be given to the builder until completion of the work. Moreover, granting of Metro operation for a long period of time (20 years, for example) is also being discussed. Interest has been expressed by French and American firms, as well as the Soviet organization, without, however, specific proposals having been submitted yet.

At any rate, the Athenians must count on--aside from other things--an approximately 10-year upheaval of the center of Athens with the execution of the project. But the trouble is worth it if the work can begin.

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BERLINGUER INTERVIEWED ON INTERNATIONAL, DOMESTIC ISSUES

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 26 Sep 80 pp 5-7

[Interview with Italian Communist Party Secretary Enrico Berlinguer by Eugenio Scalfari: "They Must Leave Kabul and Not Intervene in Poland"]

[Text] Rome--"This war between Iraq and Iran cannot have started only over control of Shatt el Arab. The area is vitally important to the entire world; the fleets of the major powers cross in the gulf; it is the heart of petroleum supplies. It is an area which not by chance is called the "gray zone," meaning the part of the world removed from the direct influence of one of the two great powers and in which their bitter competition is taking place with risks consisting of a state of confusion, instability and local conflicts headlined in news of recent years. It is unthinkable that in such a very risky situation the Iraqis would move entirely on their own initiative."

That was the beginning of the interview with Enrico Berlinguer. It lasted 3 1/2 hours and touched on the hottest points of domestic and international politics seen from the PCI point of view: From Afghanistan to Poland; from the USSR to the United States; from relations with the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] to opposition against the Cossiga government; to the trade-union autumn, to Fiat; from Lenin and Leninism to the peculiarities of the Italian communists.

Following the hard speech at the Bologna festival, Berlinguer was simultaneously attacked and flattered. He was criticized for backwardness in the party line and the "Frenchification" of the party. We asked him all these questions and we report the answers. We do not, at least here, enter into the merit of what the communist secretary said because today it is his turn to speak. We can only say as far as we are concerned that the answers were exhaustive and frank. Considering the times, this is already a lot.

The PCI secretary general says, "It is necessary that everyone cooperate in putting out the fires of war in the Middle East. From this point of view, the maximum effort should be exerted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe also can and must move with urgent initiatives in the direction of cooperation and peace, and our country has a considerable role if for no other reason than because of the recent and important accords signed with Iraq. It is clear that if a plan to overturn Iran is behind the Iraqi initiatives, this would be a very

dangerous calculation. A chain of conflicts could be started in the region that could even lead to a general conflict. This must be prevented at all costs.

'U.S. Self-Criticism Was Lacking on Iran'

[Question] Don't you believe that the Iraq initiative is due to the fearful chaos in which Iran has been struggling since the triumph of the Khomeini revolution?

[Answer] The Iran revolution was a great positive event, which destroyed the Shah's regime. It is true that serious errors have been made by the Islamic integralists who run the country. But American responsibilities are no less serious. The United States never substantially accepted recognition of the Iranian revolution's reality and of the radical change in its policy; there was never any self-criticism of the errors made through shoring up the Shah's regime. In that part of the world, the United States has always presumed it could act alone: From Truman to Eisenhower, from Rusk to Kissinger up to Brzezinski. If Iran had not been isolated and abandoned to its own fate, particularly over the past year, probably the Tehran political chaos would not have reached the level of recent months. The game of retaliation started by the United States has prevailed. Unfortunately Europe also followed the American line even though with some hesitation. It is necessary to put an end to these errors as soon as possible.

[Question] Are the dangers to peace increased or diminished by the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan in this agitated picture?

[Answer] Concerning the Afghanistan question and its negative repercussions, our opinion has been clear from the beginning and has not changed one iota: Any military presence or intervention in independent nations, which must remain so, does not help detente and threatens peace, and, in principle, cannot be justified.

[Question] In your Bologna speech you never mentioned the Afghan problem and many criticized you for this silence. They said the PCI has soft-pedaled the Afghan question.

[Answer] There was no soft-pedaling. I did not speak of Afghanistan as I did not speak about many other international political matters because I had based my speech on these subjects according to a different and precise line of reasoning. Furthermore, where is it written that every time we make a public speech or issue a document we must always repeat the complete list of our positions and polish off the universe? In any case, the PCI certainly is not a wavering and unstable party which changes its opinion over weeks and months.

[Question] The Soviet Union probably thought that the Afghanistan expedition was a military "stroll" but now it is involved in a long and bloody war. Doesn't it seem to you that at this point the Afghanistan case has become entirely similar to what 15 years ago Vietnam was for America?

[Answer] There are profound differences. The USSR military commitment is still quite far from the U.S. commitment in Vietnam. In the second place, in the

Afghanistan case, there is a common frontier between the two countries, and this, too, makes the situation quite different. And then, as you know, there are other..."

[Question] You're going to say that the USSR intervened because it was asked to by a legitimate and friendly government?

[Answer] No, I don't say that: The news from Moscow concerning the "appeal" from a friendly and legitimate government is not supported by any convincing proof. Therefore it is certain that the USSR must withdraw its occupation troops. But it is a fact that problems concerning the guarantee and security of Soviet frontiers exist in that region. The West cannot fail to take this important primary fact into account. It is necessary to guarantee Afghan independence and at the same time take into account the USSR concerns for its own security. Again from this point of view, I see a very great task for Europe and for the movement of non-aligned nations. In midsummer, Pakistan advanced a proposal that perhaps could open a road to solution of the Afghanistan question, but it was not received with the necessary commitment. I believe it should be revived and developed as soon as possible.

[Question] When the Polish question flared up, everyone asked whether the USSR would intervene. Then, at least until now, there was no intervention. This raises the question: Why intervene in Kabul and not in Warsaw? Can you give an answer?

[Answer] That is a difficult question. One would have to be a Kremlinologist and I am not one. But I can express my opinion. From what I understand the USSR understood that considerable changes had become necessary in Poland. By this I do not mean to say that the changes taking place in Poland are all welcomed by the USSR; I say that they have understood that there was no other way, that the errors made by the Polish Communist Party were serious, that contact with the masses and with the workers had become dangerously weak. After all the Polish workers themselves did not question the socialist bases of the Polish state and society or the alliance with the USSR.

[Question] Excuse me, Mr Berlinguer, but I am not satisfied with that answer. You say: Socialism and the alliance with the USSR were not questioned in Poland. But these are words. Behind the words the reality of events is different: The socialist state and communist leadership were certainly challenged; the strikes did in fact take place against the policy of the government and the party, the summits of both the party and the government were shaken; and the church had to intervene as an element both of incitement and moderation. Regarding the alliance with the USSR, it is true that no one questions this fact, but is not the very accentuation of the element of nationality, which is at the heart of the Polish question, a clear signal of how the Polish people really feel? On the other hand, Poland is in the center of the East European communist system, and is therefore in a very sensitive area for the USSR. Therefore, I again ask the question: Why intervention in Kabul and not in Warsaw?

[Answer] But why should the USSR, as you say, militarily intervene always and everywhere? This question, repeated in this fashion and insisted upon in this

way, betrays, if you permit me, a kind of obsession and demonization. You always expect the armed intervention of the USSR because you see it only and always as an oppressive gendarme..."

'It Is Not True That the CIA Is Always Behind Things'

[Question] I would admit that a check of the facts does not fail...

[Answer] But the facts are many and different and then they must always be put into an historical framework and critically interpreted. Yours, instead, seems to me to be a highly schematic method of analyzing international problems. Adopting your Manichean categories, the facts would lead us to affirm that every change that takes place in the western area is maneuvered by the CIA and American policy.

[Question] But isn't the tendency to demonize the United States actually yours?

[Answer] In the past (but times were really different), we fell into excesses of simplification. The reality we are living in today is a lot more complex and our critical abilities are much more refined. It is foolish and superficial to say that the CIA, or the Pentagon, or the Wall Street capitalists, or the multinationalist are always "behind" events; but it is foolish and superficial to reduce the USSR to an obtuse and pitiless gendarme of tyranny.

[Question] You refuse to answer my question, Mr Berlinguer?

[Answer] But yes. I have already said: In Afghanistan the USSR must have had the feeling that the friendly leadership group was in an untenable position and intervened to support it. It did not feel that way about Poland. But there is more. After the Kabul intervention, the USSR had to bear not only the expected negative reactions by conservative and reactionary nations and forces, but also the critical positions taken by--and they are the ones that counted most--almost the entire misalligned world, of a great part of the progressive and democratic forces, as well as many authoritative communist and workers parties, including our own. Undoubtedly the reactions of the latter, inspired by a vision and a plan of profound positive transformation of present relationships and international balances, have exercised an important influence on the attitudes of the Soviet Union, which has no interest in risking isolation on such a decisive terrain.

[Question] You mean to say that if Moscow had intervened or should intervene in Warsaw there would be a similar reaction by the forces you describe as worker and communist?

[Answer] There would be a very firm reaction because the consequences would be very serious for the future of a new peaceful world system.

[Question] From your words however I gather that you are confirming that the USSR is ready to intervene any time a "friendly government" risks falling. This means that the nations within the Soviet sphere of influence have a limited sovereignty.

[Answer] And according to you, we Italians who are within the American sphere of influence, don't we have a limited sovereignty?

[Question] That may be, but the forms are different in any case.

[Answer] The forms may be different, particularly here in Europe, but the substance is the same. And it is precisely such conditions that we must escape, not only ourselves, but all and possibly altogether, with a common effort for detente and cooperation moving toward progressive and parallel termination of blocs so as to guarantee mutual security through other means.

[Question] Personally I condemn this theory of limited sovereignty whether in the East or in the West, even if, I repeat, the situation in the West is not in the terms you have described.

[Answer] I appreciate the fact that you condemn this attitude in both the East and the West; and I can also tell you that I take the same position. But unfortunately condemnation does not change facts. It is necessary to act in order to avoid or remove the events we are then compelled to condemn. But let us return for a moment to your question on Afghanistan. You see: The reactions of many non-aligned nations and other democratic, working and communist forces, have certainly had an influence on the USSR. In the opposite case, the violent attacks, the boycotts, the sanctions, that America has adopted against the USSR have further embittered international relations and have given the Soviet Union a sense of isolation. That is not the right way to react and it is not at all useful to peace. Some large European nations--I speak above all of Federal Germany and of France--have seen the danger and have begun to work in the right direction, seeking to attenuate tension. I must regret the fact that the Italian government has not moved along the same line despite the ministerial presence of the socialist comrades who, I would expect, would think and act at least in the same way as the German Social Democrats concerning these questions. This is one of the major criticisms we make against the Cossiga government.

[Question] Mr Berlinguer, haven't events in Poland shaken your confidence in real socialism?

[Answer] Why speak of confidence? I would say judgment. I, at least, have never called socialism real.

[Question] Then how [did you describe it]?

[Answer] The term I use is "socialism so far achieved."

[Question] Frankly I don't see the difference.

[Answer] Yet there is [a difference]. These may be questions of terminology, but they are not lacking in importance. If you realize that the biggest religious splits always came about on a question of words...

[Question] Let us speak about this difference.

[Answer] Well then: "Real socialism" is the socialism that exists, that others (not we) can emphasize is the only one that is "really" possible. "Socialism so far achieved," instead, is simply socialism so far produced by history and that in our eyes needs considerable further development because, as it stands, it is incomplete to a considerable extent: It is only one of the various possible socialisms. It seems to me that there is a difference.

There Is Something That Is Similar to Socialism

[Question] I admit that, Mr Berlinguer, but speaking with all frankness, I must tell you that I do not see anything in the East European regimes that even remotely resembles socialism.

[Answer] You are wrong. Private ownership of the basic means of production has been abolished, the unity of the capitalist market on the world scale has been disrupted. The era of anticapitalist and anti-imperialist revolutions has begun. Does this seem negligible to you?

[Question] It is not negligible, but this, by itself, is still not an element that justifies the word socialism.

[Answer] That is not all there is: There is a notable tendency toward equality of income, there is considerable development and diffusion of education, of social welfare...

[Question] Very well, Mr Berlinguer, but tell me frankly: Why are you so concerned about repeating that there is a little bit of socialism there in any case when you know and you have seen innumerable times, that the populations of those countries do not have freedom of expression, workers do not even have the right to strike and they had to conquer this with a very fierce struggle in Poland. Whatever kind of socialism is that?

[Answer] Just so: It is that amount of socialism so far achieved. However, consider: The Polish workers do not in the least think about returning the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk to some private capitalist. If anything, they are thinking about worker self-administration. And why? because their just struggle starts from a socialist basis and develops in that direction.

[Question] But they raised the image of the Madonna over the Lenin Shipyards. After 35 years of socialism so far achieved, as you say, that is not a great sign of adherence to the principles of Karl Marx.

[Answer] Religion in Poland is a formative element of the identity of that nation and the Polish socialist regime has certainly made errors, but not that of trampling the feelings of the people or even of not giving merited weight to the strong Catholic element of the national-popular tradition of its own country. So it is not so much surprise if the image of the Madonna was raised over the Lenin Shipyard of Danzig? Then, listen: What are you trying to tell me? That Polish socialism is nothing but a brutal police dictatorship? That is absolutely not true. That the nation is led by a group of antiworker exploiters? That is

absolutely not true. That the people, the Poles, dream of reopening the stock market, the return of Polish nobility and capitalists at the head of companies? That is absolutely not true. That the Polish Communist Party, if it could, would put the bishops in jail? And not even that is true.

[Question] However, every time we touched on the subject of Soviet intervention, you always said "so far it has not happened," Why? Are you afraid that it could happen?

[Answer] I hope not. It would be a very serious thing if it did happen. But certainly the Polish crisis is still not finished. A further process of evolution has taken place in that country and, for the first time, the government and the party have accepted introduction of certain institutional changes. Now we will see how they work. Certainly great understanding and great prudence and knowledge of historical processes are needed from all. Errors on one side or the other, in one direction or the other, could compromise everything.

[Question] Don't the Polish events remind you of some well-known historical precedent?

[Answer] What precedent?

[Question] Kronstadt, 1921. Because there the workers demanded self-administration and the power of the soviet, but the Red Guard fired upon them. Don't you believe that the Leninism of Kronstadt since then has been incompatible with democratic and self-administering socialism which Walesa also wants?

[Answer] In 1921 Russia was deeply involved in a revolution, in a full-scale civil war, under the attack of capitalist powers and the white armies. I do not believe the comparison is justifiable. After all no one in Gdansk or at Szczecin caused the Red Guard to move.

[Question] But, Mr Berlinguer, Leninism has remained the same since Kronstadt. This is why the question is raised again every time, considering that you still have not admitted that you have abandoned Leninism. You never made this little statement, and I think I understand that you do not want to make it. Yet when you speak of socialism, of the "third road" I see nothing of Leninism in the things you say. Then why not make that little statement?

[Answer] Does it seem all that important to you?

[Question] Frankly, yes. In any case, you yourself said that the great splits always came about on questions of words. But please answer my question.

[Answer] All right. We have said an infinite number of times that Lenin is not a prophet, that the tablets of the law do not exist for Italian communists, that the operation carried out by Stalin to dredge from Lenin's thought a kind of manual to be applied in all cases today cannot but be rejected, and we reject it fully. Lenin is a great political leader and a great revolutionary thinker. There are parts of his thinking which we believe still have a fundamental validity for

the entire workers movement; there are others that historical and theoretical development of the struggle and of communist thought have made obsolete, creating a situation in which they, to use Engels' phrase, "deserve to die."

'The Part of Leninism We Reject'

[Question] Mr Berlinguer, this matter is very important and I would finally like a very precise answer, if you can give it to me. I would like you to tell me what part of Lenin's thought you still follow and what part you no longer think valid.

[Answer] I'm glad you asked me that. So, let me give some examples: Lenin at a certain point in fact (not theoretically) identified the party with the state. We, however, totally reject that identification. Secondly: Lenin always maintained that the dictatorship of the proletariat was a necessary phase of the revolutionary process. We reject that thesis, which has not been ours for a very long time. Third: Lenin maintained that the revolution has two clearly separate phases: A democratic-bourgeois, and later a socialist phase. For us, instead, democracy is also a product of the proletarian struggle, is a collection of victories that the working class defends and extends and therefore is an unrenounceable and universal value that must be guaranteed in striving toward and establishing a socialist society.

[Question] It seems to me you are rejecting all of Lenin.

[Answer] No. Lenin discovered the need for alliances of the working class and we are fully in agreement with this need. Lenin fought for the termination of trade unionism, of corporativism, of workers aristocracies, and we completely agree with Lenin on this too. Finally, Lenin prized voluntary intervention, the "subjective" moment for party action, its inventive and innovative function, which transcends and transforms details of the present and he did not yield to a "natural" reformist evolutionism. On this too, we agree with Lenin.

[Question] Machiavelli said this before Lenin did.

[Answer] As you know, we communists too have read Machiavelli, as did Gramsci and Togliatti. But Machiavelli, who also was a great revolutionary of his time, referred to the individual "virtue" of a prince, while we refer to a political formation that organizes the masses for the transformation of society.

[Question] From what you say, I would conclude that your Leninism is finished.

[Answer] That is not what I think, but if that is your conclusion you are entitled to it.

[Question] I say I do not believe, at this point, whatever the reasons that keep you communists and socialists apart. The reasons that brought about the Leghorn split of 1921. [As published].

[Answer] That's a good question. I will answer. First I want to say that at Leghorn, the Communist Party had a bad birth on the basis of an ultrasectarian line, which was Bordiga's. And so it proceeded until 1924. The change began in 1924

and was sanctioned politically by the congress of Lyons in 1926. The Italian Communist Party today is not so much the child of the Bordiga split of 1921 as of the action and thought of Gramsci and the Turin group, which took the lead at Lyons and which later, finally overcame and liquidated the sectarian line of Amadeo Bordiga, but they also criticized and defeated the opportunist rightist line of Angelo Tasca. I want to add another consideration: When the party was born it was a very small minority that broke off from the old socialist trunk; unlike, for example, what happened in France, where the main part of the socialist party became the communist party. But since then, first secretly, then in the partisan war, and finally in these 35 years of democratic life, the PCI has been the main force of the Italian workers' and popular movement. There must be a reason, an explanation.

We and the PSI: This Was the Split

[Question] And what is it? I am asking you.

[Answer] You see, the old socialism, the reformist and maximalist socialism, carried out a very great function of consciousness raising, of creating class organizations, of promoting memorable struggles of the working masses: It did a great deal to "redeem the masses" as they said then. That first season, that growing phase of the workers' movement was rich, noble, heroic, but also confused. The PCI, in its various currents, did not have a clear political strategy, did not know how to lead the working class in exercising the leadership and transforming function of national society and of its political guide: First it was shattered, and then--locked within the reformist horizon--it was defeated. Instead, the PCI despite its original limitations, was something else. The PCI became rooted in the working class, in the plants, in the rural areas, in society and, struggling incessantly day by day, year by year, it knew how to interpret and provide correct objectives for the interests, the aspirations, the ideals of the working class and of increasingly broader strata of society. If we are what we are today, evidently we have thought, worked and struggled better than others; we did not fall, in general, into those errors that were fatal in the past to the workers' movement: sectarian isolation and reformist weaknesses.

[Question] I asked you earlier if the reasons for the 1921 split exist today. I think I understand from your answer that to a large extent they have disappeared.

[Answer] Things have changed. A political reunification of the workers' movement certainly is not outside of our purview. But we must realize that history has created two parties, the communist and the socialist, with a different past behind them and therefore with a different identity. The two parties of the Italian workers' movement still exist today each with its own reason for being and with its own role.

[Question] An antithetical role? Are they two antagonistic parties? Judging from the situation over the past few months one would say yes.

[Answer] One would say yes, but it is a serious error to perpetuate a situation which damages the left, that plays the game of its adversaries, and which particularly today favors the most closed and coarsest part of the Christian Democratic Party.

[Question] The PCI and you personally have large responsibilities in this situation of conflict with the PSI.

[Answer] You think so? It does not seem so to me. What would these responsibilities be? Certainly not in the trade-unions: Our comrades in the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] have always defended trade-union unity. In local councils we have been and are loyal collaborators of the socialists and we would always like to extend and strengthen those alliances. We played a determining role in the election of a socialist for the presidency of the republic. There are those who said then that we imposed the Pertini candidacy on the PSI. In reality, from the beginning we considered Pertini not a party candidate, but one who was common to the entire left and all of democratic and antifascist Italy. Where, then, is our disloyalty?

[Question] The socialists criticize you both for your lack of support at the time of the center-left, and the preferential relationship with the DC over their [the socialists'] heads during the 3 years of "national solidarity" between 1976 and 1978.

[Answer] All this is absolutely untrue. There was no preferential relationship between ourselves and the DC over the heads of the socialists. I wish that charge were proved specifically, that a fact, a date, in short a specific fact were given. Certainly, when the PCI entered the parliamentary majority after 30 years, it was big news and it shook international as well as Italian public opinion. Certainly, the numerical weight of the two parties was and is different. It may be that from these real, objective facts, the socialist comrades gathered the impression that they were underestimated compared with us. But is this enough to say that the PCI joined the DC in a pincer movement against the socialists? As far as the center-left is concerned, I must recall that at its birth our attitude was very open. Then, it is true, it changed, but was it not supposed to change? The right had launched a counteroffensive, you should recall it: It was the time of the SIFAR [Armed Forces Intelligence Service] case, of De Lorenzo; of the ferocious right monetary policy of the Bank of Italy. The socialists went along with that shift: They justified their participation and partnership in the government with the "least worst case" theory. I do not want to dispute whether they could have put up a greater resistance, but I note the fact. The center-left changed. The DC conceived it as a formula for disrupting the left...

[Question] And was it?

[Answer] Yes, to some extent it was; this cannot be denied. The very unification of the PCI with the PSDI [Italian Social Democratic Party] was conceived with the intention of sanctioning a break with the rest of the left. And what were we supposed to do under those circumstances except what we did do, that is develop a firm, consistent but certainly not subversive opposition? After all, whenever was PCI opposition subversive, obstructionist, aimed at "the worse things are, the better"? Even here I ask that I be shown a single concrete fact; one would be enough. I know of none.

The Independence of the Trade Union Movement

[Question] The trade union movement did not cooperate at all in the center-left planning. In this way it contributed to the failure of that experiment. Today

you talk a lot about planning, but at that time you said no. This is the simple truth.

[Answer] Why do you ask me that question? Everyone goes overboard in proclaiming the independence of the trade union movement. But if the latter takes positions that do not please, then we are asked to pay the bill. But after all, do you really consider the trade union movement independent or not? Why, if it behaves as the majority wants, is it autonomous; and if it behaves as the opposition wants, it once more becomes a "transmission belt" for the PCI? All this way of reasoning seems to me extremely weak to say the least. In those years the trade unions rejected the incomes policy. Let us not forget that they were years in which the real average wage was still far from European levels and the trade union had the "unacceptable aim" of bringing it to that level. The incomes policy as it was conceived then, and considering the existing power relationships, was supposed to have served to "moderate" the trade unions. In its independence, the trade unions said no.

[Question] And you supported them.

[Answer] Yes, we supported them and I think we were entirely right in doing so. But, to return to the question of relations between the PCI and PSI, it is true instead that often the DC tried to use the socialists for anticommunist purposes or at least as a brake on communist pressure. In short, it tried to divide the left.

[Question] And did it succeed?

[Answer] It succeeded sometimes.

[Question] Mr Berlinguer, what if I were to ask you for proof of that statement?

[Answer] Go on! We all know the history of the past 30 years and particularly that of the past 20.

[Question] Let us speak at least of the more recent years, after the beginning of the policy of national solidarity, after 1976.

[Answer] Very well, I want to state one fact. It was December 1977; it was the government of abstention. A crisis developed on our initiative: We believed that that intermediate phase was exhausted and the time had come to form a new government with our participation. The socialist leaders did not at all commit themselves to achieving that objective which they claimed, in words, to consider very important. The same thing was repeated recently, after the 1979 elections. Until I get proof to the contrary, I must deduce that the present socialist secretariat does not at all want the PCI in the government: At the first DC veto, it accepts the fait accompli.

[Question] Would you be willing to make an agreement with the socialists on the basis of which the two parties commit themselves to working together either in the government or in the opposition?

[Answer] I would be very willing to do so. In fact, look: I will take advantage of the opportunity you offer me to formulate a formal proposal in that regard.

[Question] Then yours is a precise and formal proposal?

[Answer] Yes, exactly so.

[Question] Very well, we will find out what the PSI answers, but in the meantime let me ask you another question. If the PSI was lukewarm concerning the possibility of the admission of communists into government, you are very lukewarm concerning the possibility of a socialist cabinet. It seems to me you are paying in the same coin.

[Answer] Listen: We are convinced that with the daisy chain of government formulas, if there is concern only with the ranks, the problems of the country will not be solved...

[Question] It seemed not; it seemed that if the PCI had entered into the majority and, better still, into the government, everything would have been put in order...

[Answer] We never thought or said this. After all, we too have had our own experience. When in January 1979--in the face of the DC involution (which was supposed to culminate in the line of the "preamble") and in the face of PSI wavering (which is supposed to have culminated in the alliance with the DC of the "preamble")--we realized that our presence in the parliamentary majority of solidarity was not sufficient to impose a new development on the political situation and the conditions of the country, we went on our way. We do not intend to return to that experience or to any experiences of that kind regardless of how they are camouflaged or embellished. In any case, our attention to government formulas that exclude us is very scant. The workers' movement must go into government united; and, certainly, if the prime minister no longer was a Christian democrat but a socialist, this would be a new interesting fact. But there could also be a socialist prime minister of a government desiring a rupture with the rest of the workers' movement; and this would be a negative fact. Or, there could be a socialist prime minister who believes that because the government has that formula, the communists are obliged to give him an a priori guarantee of cooperation, and be content, in brief, with being spear carriers. And this, too, would be unacceptable for us.

[Question] You criticize an attitude of preconceived criticism against the Cossiga government. It is said that you are trying to demonstrate that governability is impossible in Italy without the PCI. And in order to demonstrate this you care nothing about the real problems of the country.

[Answer] Who says that?

[Question] Many say it, and you know it well. Many socialists, too, and after all suspicions have been raised in unbiased sectors of public opinion because of the

fact that the PCI has taken a position against the government from the beginning, from the moment of its birth, without waiting for the test of events.

[Answer] The test of events? The first event was the list of ministers: The demo-Christians who were chosen according to the most iron-clad division of seats among the currents, with the Cencelli manual in hand, while among the socialists the left believed it was not worth the trouble of becoming committed. After a congress such as that of the Christian democrats, where the position of conflict with us, of our "untouchability," won out, I do not see how a ministry made up in that way could induce us to arrive at different conclusions and take different attitudes. But then, in addition to its composition, there was another very important negative fact: The government appeared in the chambers without a program. In the economic field, the prime minister told parliament that the plan would be submitted later. You tell me, considering present circumstances and pressing needs, whether we could have accepted a government without a program. Then we came to concrete events: The failure to make banking appointments, and the savage sharing of the few that were made, the economic decrees and the deflationary and recessionary policy, the shame of what is happening at RAI [Italian Radio Network], a foreign policy which under the best of circumstances is inert and passive and at worst is uselessly servile toward the most extremist currents of the West. But then there was the basic event: This government is blocking any possible positive evolution of the political situation, both the general situation of the country and that of the parties in government. Don't the leftists in the DC and the PSI, and Senator Spadolini himself, have anything to say about the paradox of a real majority that exists in the country and in Parliament itself, and which is not organized and does not affirm itself for reasons unknown considering the fact that they use empty words to say that the ideological prejudice against the PCI is now overcome? There is much talk about governability, but what does it mean: That the government continues in existence by virtue only of decrees and votes of confidence (perhaps with only one majority vote) and that it succeeds from time to time in taking some decision that is late, insufficient or erroneous? That is not governability. Governability is to succeed in implementing a policy of change that would satisfy general needs through a unified political guide that receives and earns the consensus of the country's large social forces.

[Question] Then, Cossiga leaves. Then what?

[Answer] And then there would be a government that would get the political situation started again and would succeed in governing more seriously, more cleanly. This government is not making it.

[Question] You would always be in the opposition, but more softly.

[Answer] Not more softly, we don't favor deception, and if we are in the opposition, we will fight firmly. Do you remember the Moro-La Malfa government? Even then we were plying our trade of opposition, but for example, we did not ask for the immediate fall of that government because we felt that it could contribute to opening the road to more advanced solutions. We accepted our role and we carried it out to the end. We are asking the present government to go away because its continuation in office does nothing but putrefy the situation and lead the nation adrift.

[Question] In the meantime, the trade union autumn is in full swing; there are open questions such as that of Fiat, which are very big. Do you share the position of the trade union?

[Answer] When we do not agree with the trade union we say so openly, comrade to comrade. This time we are absolutely in agreement: Tens of thousands of workers cannot be thrown out of work because Fiat made the wrong model of automobile; and this certainly was not its only error.

[Question] Mr Berlinguer, there is a worldwide automobile crisis, do you know that?

[Answer] Yes I do know it, but I also know that there are foreign automobile groups that are doing well because they had better managers than those of Fiat. The crisis is not the same for all.

[Question] In any case, there is declining demand abroad, the factories fire personnel, then they hire again when the crisis is over...

[Answer] Well, listen, things went like that here too for a very long time, but now, for some years, it is no longer that way and it is not possible to return to that system. And it is well that things have changed. The workers, the people, cannot be treated like a package: "Today you work here, tomorrow there, tomorrow you don't work at all." This approach is finished in Italy and there is no Agnelli or Confindustria or "preambular" government that can revive it. This does not at all mean that the workers can do as they please in the factories and in the offices, it does not at all mean that we must be tolerant of absenteeism, that forms of mobility cannot be implemented (but absolutely guaranteed) from one factory to another. The PCI has never encouraged that kind of behavior. And after all, we understand that the plant can have a need to reduce the labor force and to improve the pace of production. The proposals of the trade union in the Fiat dispute seemed to me generally adequate to also achieve the objectives the company was interested in. But if among those objectives there had also been that of humiliating the trade union and to regain a free hand, well, then the resistance will be very stiff.

'We Are Not a Monolithic Party'

[Question] Mr Berlinguer, are you sure of your party?

[Answer] What do you mean?

[Question] I am asking whether you have the feeling that the party rank and file shares the line of the leaders, the line of increasingly marked independence from the USSR, the line of gradual updating your Leninism, the line of a progressive rapprochement toward the West and the European social democratic forces?

[Answer] I think so. Unlike what is being said, ours is not a monolithic party if this word means that there is a small group that thinks and decides for all. On the contrary: It is a complex party, where there is a co-existence both among the rank and file and among the leaders, of positions that are sometimes different,

where there is debate, at times even polemics. Our democratic centralism is not at all a "reductio ad unum" of opinions. But it is the rule which when applied arrives democratically at the political unity of the party and guarantees both its orientation and practical behavior. Our power is precisely in this: We are not practicing a summit policy, we are a mass party that knows how to continuously question the rank and file and the militants, knows how to accept their contribution, tries to interpret their needs and their will.

[Question] I asked whether the party is in agreement with the political line of the leaders.

[Answer] I answered that I believe so. The party wants guarantees on three points: One, that our attitude of full independence and constructive criticism toward the USSR does not mean wiping out 60 years of history and of contributions that country has given to defeating Nazi-fascism and to the development of movements of emancipation of workers and peoples; two, that the policy of unity with all progressive forces does not mean the abandonment of our class roots; three, that the development of democracy in our internal party life does not mean the birth of currents and splinter groups. This is what the party and all of us want. That is, we have no intention of losing our identity. For the rest, we are within history and with history, we are a great democratic force for change; and we want to renew ourselves continuously so that we will not fail to keep our appointments with history.

6034

CSO: 3104

TRAINING, PERSONNEL PROBLEMS PLAGUE ETA; GRAPO WITHERS

Madrid BLANCO Y NEGRO in Spanish 23-29 Jul 68 pp 7-8

[Interview with Interior Minister Juan Jose Roson, by Ana de Benavides, in Madrid; date not given]

[Text] "We are witnessing the difficulties the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] is currently experiencing in terms of the volume of human resources. Probably few trained commandos remain--without a doubt, fewer than before. This is the reason they have to use people with less training, for which reason, logically, the risk of failure is greater."

I was welcomed by Juan Jose Roson in his office at the Ministry of Interior promptly at 0800 hours. His face showed no traces of fatigue or of the days spent in constant travels to the Costa del Sol, the Levant and Ibiza, nor the early hour. One would say he has grown accustomed to wakeful nights on frequent occasions in his 4 years at the head of the civil government in Madrid. He is an active man; it could also be said that he is optimistic and has an innate facility for analyzing problems, one after the other, and, after some private thought, making a judgment.

And the problems posed by the Ministry of Interior are important, there can be no doubt. The continuous threats from the ETA will not leave the inoffensive summer vacationers in peace, crime constantly violates the citizens' security, and the forces of law and order never cease their efforts to achieve a calm which seems to some utopian.

But here we have the minister of interior, an eminently optimistic man who stated recently: "We will put an end to the two branches of the ETA."

The Battle Against the ETA

[Question] Mr Minister, do you not think that these statements, in addition to being optimistic, may be in a way ambitious?

[Answer] I have the impression that the press has not reported my statements precisely. All I said is that there is an open battle between the two branches of the ETA and the Spanish people, including the Basque people, and that this battle, although slow and difficult, will be won by the people, since there is solidarity among all of us and the state security bodies and forces.

[Question] Could you project a date for the eradication of the ETA?

[Answer] No, there is no such date. It is difficult to speak of days, months or years in a process such as this. I have always said that the battle will be slow but that it will inexorably be Spain which wins it. I would say that we are at the beginning of a final stage in which the ETA phenomenon will finally be eradicated.

The Failures of the ETA

[Question] Returning to your statements at the beginning of the interview, is the impression a large sector of the people have about the repeated failures of the ETA in recent times really accurate?

[Answer] In fact, both the police and the civil guard have the impression that the level of technical preparation revealed in the activities of the last commando groups in the organization has declined. This may be true because in the months of May and June, the number of arrests which occurred as compared to others in earlier years was very large. Since the ETA has limited numbers in its ranks, probably they are having difficulty currently in terms of manpower.

[Question] Is terrorism the most serious aspect in the great sea of problems facing the country?

[Answer] I would say that although it is not the most serious problem, its effects are such that terrorism is having a very decisive effect on the daily pursuit of national life.

[Question] On various occasions the minister of interior has made statements about the international relations required to combat the terrorist struggle. What would these international measures be?

[Answer] It is basic that each country begin to realize that any terrorist group functioning elsewhere is potentially a terrorist group which can act upon that country too. This is a basic fact which all governments should take into account.

The People Have Reacted

[Question] There are those who have the impression that Juan Jose Roson is an optimist and that perhaps it is better to approach the subject of the ETA with optimism than with pessimism.

[Answer] I think that no problem should be approached under any pessimistic pressure, since from that viewpoint, one is in a difficult position for resolving problems. I continue to be optimistic, with regard to the ETA and any other subject, and I am optimistic because I have great confidence in the Spanish people. The Spaniard is the type of individual who rises to difficulties, becomes capable of abandoning his individuality when faced with an enemy and capable of giving rise to the concept of solidarity.

[Question] And, with regard to the ETA, have the Spanish people reacted in this way?

[Answer] I am absolutely persuaded that the reaction has begun. Recent events--not the slightest doubt can remain--have led us all to unite, whatever our ideology, social or economic status, in a common front which will allow us to triumph over the ETA and find the solutions this new phase of national coexistence requires.

GRAPO No Longer a Danger

[Question] Proceeding to another subject also having to do with terrorism, is the GRAPO [First of October Armed Revolutionary Group] entirely under control?

[Answer] I would say that it will take some time before we can say that a violent phenomenon of a revolutionary nature is under control. In my view, it is in a very bad position for trying to raise its head, although there are some individuals--precisely those who escaped from the Zamora prison--who represent a certain risk insofar as they may potentially attempt to reorganize it. In this connection, the police are watching closely to prevent the group from becoming as solid as it was again.

[Question] Then perhaps we could make the happy statement that the GRAPO is not a danger.

[Answer] It is not a danger today, but it has not ceased to exist. To say that a group of this nature has disappeared takes more time than has elapsed, since this is necessary for the destruction of the last links between the organization and what were the groups of sympathizers from which, at a given time, the activists emerged.

Deteriorating Safety

Other themes of the greatest importance--the safety of the citizens and public order--are on the agenda of the minister of labor.

[Question] What is the present status in these sectors of such importance to the Spanish people?

[Answer] Citizens' safety as a whole has deteriorated in terms of the criminal world. I would say that there has been little change in the status for approximately a year, one which was worse than preceding years. Now then, I think that these phenomena must be analyzed in terms of a time dimension, not taking the figures for just one month as the sole point of reference. In any case, what is obvious is that it is possible to improve the situation and that is what we are attempting to do.

Possible Improvement

[Question] In what way could this situation be improved?

[Answer] First of all, the existence of legislative support is basic. Fortunately, this platform has already been established with the amendment of certain precepts in the criminal prosecution law and also the law establishing urgent

procedures for the trial of certain crimes. Other provisions continue to be needed, but with these it is already possible to attack that serious phenomenon within the world of crime, recidivism. The results will be seen in a few months, since a number of criminal repeaters will be removed from society by trial and unconditional imprisonment.

[Question] Will the security forces also be subjected to some type of improvement?

[Answer] In fact, the state security forces and bodies will be provided with better facilities on the basis of better coordination among them. And finally, improvements will be achieved through greater cooperation between society and the security forces and bodies. All of this is consistent with plans which are being drafted and which, I am confident, will be put into effect beginning in the month of September. As of that time I think that the situation may improve.

A Categorical No to Amnesty

[Question] Exactly 3 years ago, in the course of an interview, Juan Jose Roson said--speaking on the subject of amnesty--that in some criminal cases, it is not possible to blot out the record and begin afresh. Coming now to the current situation, would you favor a new amnesty?

[Answer] Categorically no, this is a closed subject. Amnesty is an exceptional measure, and from this point of view, I must note that the text of the constitution provided for amnesty as an act of clemency. This is an approach which is no longer viable, above all because, unfortunately, what has become obvious is that on the basis of that amnesty, the situation has not improved. In the realm of terrorism the situation is the same now as then.

[Question] You, Juan Jose Roson, perhaps better than anyone, know that you hold a post which involves conflict and unpopularity. What reasons led you to accept it?

[Answer] I got into what is called the political "round" and sometimes one comes to positions which are more enjoyable, and some less. Some time ago I became aware that I might be given this responsibility and I thought that I might perhaps be able to contribute something positive in this struggle. I have already found out that my term as minister of interior will be full of annoyances and very few satisfactions. However, I believe that in the end I will be satisfied. To the extent that I can contribute to the achievement of the two highest goals and aspirations--safety and the right to live in peace--I will have justified my actions in public life and above all as minister of the interior.

Just One Link

[Question] When the ETA problem is resolved, when the battle has been won, will you feel your work in this ministry as finished?

[Answer] Well, I think that we are in a situation in which I am but one more link in the chain. The ETA is one of the problems faced. There are others which are,

if you will, more serious. Concretely and speaking of the ETA, it may be resolved during my term or perhaps in a longer period of time.

[Question] At what point currently are the relations between this ministry and Euzkadiko Ezquerria?

[Answer] There are two types of relations for the Ministry of Interior. Where a political group made up of a series of political forces, functioning within legality, is involved, it merits full respect. When on the contrary there is the suspicion that it may be involved in relations with groups which are committing crimes, the Ministry of Interior has the obligation, in defense of the state, to order the situation clarified.

[Question] A final question, Mr Minister. Do you offer the Spanish people optimism or hope?

[Answer] I would say hope, which is the highest level of optimism.

5157

CSO: 3110

SIRMEN EXAMINES TURKEY'S STRATEGIC POSITION, PROBLEMS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 29 Sep 80 p 3

/Article by Ali Sirmen: "Oil-Middle East: NATO-Turkey"/

/Text/ The change of power in Turkey brought a flood of reporters from many nations to Ankara, turning the eyes of the world upon us. The interest in Turkey might have lasted longer had not the explosion of the Iran-Iraq war, which had been giving warning signs for quite some time, diverted attention, and the reporters, beyond our borders to the southeast, to the Persian Gulf.

The Iran-Iraq war returned the Middle East, the oil problem and the Persian Gulf to the number one position on the world agenda. Now the eyes of the whole world have turned to the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, in Washington, State Department and Pentagon experts watch developments closely. What separates the experts from the people who make up public opinion is that they look at events within a broader time and geographical frame. This is why the Iran-Iraq war has led them, contrary to public opinion in their own nations, to take an even closer look at Turkey.

In fact, the idea that Turkey would have a new role to play with regard to Middle Eastern oil is not very new. Ever since world oil prices started going up, indeed since the fall of the shah in Iran, State Department and Pentagon officials have been looking at Turkey in a much different light, wanting to give Ankara new roles to play.

In an article on 27 September, Orsan Oymen spoke of a meeting held in Washington at the U.S. State Department, pointing out that some American experts and officials had complained that the DCA /Defense Cooperation Agreement/ signed between Ankara and Washington does not allow U.S. bases in Turkey to be used for non-NATO purposes. Oymen added that these same experts had expressed their anxiety over the fact that the NATO area of responsibility and initiative does not cover the oil region. To add to this picture the readiness of certain circles in the United States, for some time, to intervene in the Middle East oil region at a moment's notice and their active lobbying for going into action immediately if necessary, it becomes a rather grim scene.

Further, it is known that the General Staff, together with the civilian government in Turkey, did not accept such a solution during the DCA discussions. General Orhan Yurtan, who is today the head of state, chairman of the National Security Council and chief of staff, was also head of the General Staff during the DCA discussions. It is a fact known by everybody that the Turkish General Staff, as it

was then continues today to be an assiduous guardian of our nation's role in the region and the world and is at great pains not to swerve from the principle of "Peace at Home, Peace Abroad" in Turkey's foreign policy.

It is not necessary to reiterate the value to the Turkish people, the states of the region and world peace of a policy based on such circumspection.

Turkey's attentive approach to all developments in the Middle East is, first of all, to live within peace within the National Pact / of 1920/ boundaries and to act on the principle of establishing peaceful relations with its neighbors and the other nations of the world.

Even those who believe most firmly in the benefits to Turkey of NATO membership have always admitted that this membership is limited by putting what strengthens the National Pact boundaries under the umbrella of a deterrent force.

In this case, it cannot be said that the new roles which certain Pentagon and State Department officials want to give to Turkey will be met very positively in Ankara.

The statements made by Head of State, National Security Chairman and Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren in his 12 September address and first press conference are of a nature to signify that Turkey will not swerve from its foreign policy deriving from the principle of peace at home, peace abroad and bounded by the National Pact lines, a peaceful foreign policy contributing to moderation.

This being the case, the desires of the experts and people of authority at the Pentagon and the State Department assume an appearance of one-sided intentions to which it would be impossible to give a positive answer.

8349

CSO: 4907

EFFORTS MADE TO MEET OIL NEEDS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 30 Sep 80 pp 1,7

[Article by Yalcin Dogan]

[Tran:] Ankara (CUMHURİYET BUREAU) -- With the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war and their bombing of each other's oil production and pumping stations, various nations of the world have turned to other OPEC nations to answer their oil needs, while Turkey, too, has gone to various oil producing nations and especially Saudi Arabia and Libya in this connection.

When Iran and Iraq, which represent an important part of Middle Eastern oil, begin to default on delivery of their oil, every nation finds itself doing what it can. This has had two important results. One has to do with the increase of oil production in other OPEC nations. Western nations in particular have asked the OPEC nations to increase production for the purpose of meeting their needs. The second result has to do with the price of spot purchases. According to the information obtained, spot oil purchases have increased rapidly in the past week and spot prices have also risen rapidly in keeping with this increased demand.

Turkey's Status

Turkey, too, is a nation affected as to oil by the Iran and Iraq war. However, the authorities report that "these effects are limited because 1980's needs are covered through the first of December."

Looking at Turkey's oil imports, the following picture emerges: We are due 1 million tons of oil from Iran by the end of 1980; from Iraq, 1.5 million tons. Commitments were made for 1 million tons from Iraq for 1980; 3.5 million tons of this was provided by the oil pipeline into Yumurtalik which was bombed 2 days ago. The remaining 1.5 million tons are due from Iraq. Turkey's other oil commitments are proceeding normally in line with agreements. Iran has also reported officially that the remaining 1 million tons of oil will be delivered.

However, the oil from Iraq has an important characteristic. Because of the quality of Iraqi oil, Turkey gets primarily diesel fuel and fuel oil from this petroleum. The special nature of Iraqi oil comes from the ease and cheapness of production of these two products. Oil purchases from Libya, for example, is used primarily in the production of gasoline, because gasoline can be produced cheaply and easily

from Libyan oil. Turkey's need at the moment is primarily for fuel oil and diesel fuel, not gasoline. Therefore, Turkey is applying to various world nations through Foreign Ministry channels, seeking oil of the quality of Iraqi oil and to replace it.

Pipeline Repair

Oil obtained from Iraq comes, in accordance with the agreement concluded in past years, from the oil flowing into Yumurtalik. According to the agreement between Turkey and Iraq, Iraq will provide Turkey with 10 million tons of oil by means of this pipeline by 1982. This amount will rise to 14 million tons after 1982.

The fact that oil purchased from Iraq comes through the pipeline and the bombing of the pipeline may cause Turkey some degree of difficulty after December. Authorities pointed out that the pipeline will be repaired in 2 or 3 days and said, "The important thing is not the bombing of this line but the status of the oil pumping stations in Kirkuk." There is no question of a shortage because of the pipeline as long as Iraq is pumping the oil in Kirkuk.

Authorities report that, although oil production continues to be affected by the Iran-Iraq war, other things can be done. Besides going to other oil nations, Turkey reportedly will be able to enter the spot market when circumstances demand.

8349

CSO: 4907

INCREASED USE OF COAL REPORTED

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 29 Sep 80 p 1

/Text/ More economic measures have been taken to prevent rising expenditures and costs following price hikes between 11 percent and 22 percent on petroleum products. The switch from fuel oil to coal in businesses and apartment houses has been stepped up.

Believing in the need to switch from liquid fuel to solid fuel, managers of industrial establishments and apartment houses have pointed out that fuel oil, which has risen 11 percent from 18.5 Turkish liras per liter to 21 liras per liter, will bring increased costs and say that they believe a quick change will be necessary for this reason and that they have begun working on it.

Following the new changes in liquid fuel prices, large and small industrial establishments and multiple dwelling units in Anatolia and many areas of the country are already making the switch to coal, it was learned. Small foundries using liquid fuel reportedly were having difficulties in this connection, but will be saved from the effects of this price hike by the new measures. It is said to be impossible for the small brass and cast iron foundries to raise prices on their products by 25 percent to 40 percent because it would completely destroy them, as consumption is at a standstill anyway. Trying to cut down on costs for this reason, the small industries will reportedly be reducing their workforce as well as converting oil furnaces to coal or wood.

Many dwellings in Istanbul which were built for the use of fuel oil are seen to be stepping up the conversion to coal. A reported 30 percent increase in the need for coal is expected throughout the country this year as a result of the rapid change, with coal consumption increasing even more next year.

2124

CSU 4907

IMPACT OF GOLDEN HORN MASTER PLAN EXAMINED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 24 Sep 80 p 2

/Article by General Seyfi Kipmen, ret. (master engineer)/

/Text/ The true salvation of the Golden Horn and the surrounding area would be clean and plentiful flowing water. The final report on implementing the Golden Horn Master Plan would reduce the present flow, already as dirty as it is small, from the Golden Horn to the Marmara. The counter current which will enter the Golden Horn from the Straits and the Marmara where this flow empties will thus be reduced by this rate also, soon bringing the Golden Horn to the state of a lake subject to the same pollution. The Golden Horn cannot be saved until the current and counter current problem is solved. Any measures taken will fail. Study of the Final Report on the Golden Horn Master Plan and Implementation Program clearly reveals this fact.

Golden Horn Master Plan

A symposium on the Golden Horn was held at ITU /Istanbul Technical University/ in 1975. Our nation's most distinguished scientific and technical authorities who attended this symposium published bulletins on the Golden Horn and its surrounding area and gathered their studies on the status and improvement of them into a work entitled "Golden Horn Symposium."

The second Golden Horn symposium (at the Bosphorus Technical University) published the "Golden Horn Master Plan and Implementation Program Final Report" as a work including the ITU symposium also for the use of the Public Works Ministry Directorate for Railroads, Ports and Airports.

This work was summarized in an article entitled "How Will the Golden Horn and Its Environs Be Saved?" by Professor Dr Semih Tezcan in the 27 December 1977 MILLIYET newspaper. A paragraph of the article headed "What Are the Goals?" divided procedures into 10 categories as follows:

1. A large part of the nearly 100 businesses (which pollute the Golden Horn) located on the shores of the Golden Horn should be moved to the development areas designated under the Istanbul City Plan.
2. The stretch between Balat and Eyup should be dredged to facilitate maritime transport.

3. The 70 hectares between Silahdaraga and Eyup should be reclaimed by filling it in and building a public parking lot.
4. The baffles and piers lining the Golden Horn should be straightened up and docks built for shipping.
5. Slopes should be planted with trees to prevent water run-off and erosion.
6. Canals should be dug to provide passage from the shores of the Golden Horn to Eyup and Salihdaraga.
7. Roads should be built on both sides of the Golden Horn.
8. Conduits should be under the roads for water mains, telephone and telegraph cables and drainage.
9. Restoration of religious and historic remains from the Byzantine and Ottoman periods.
10. Opening the Eyup-Sultan complex to the public.

These are the goals of the Golden Horn Master Plan, hoped to be completed in 12 years and expected to cost 2 billion liras. There is no mention among these goals of providing for a current from the Golden Horn to the Marmara. A significant portion of the almost 100 businesses which pollute the Golden Horn will be moved so that the Golden Horn will be deprived of their moving waters which ensure the small, albeit dirty, current in the Golden Horn. Moreover, various waste waters will not enter the Golden Horn as drainage. For these reasons, the small current which the fluids, though dirty, presently provide will be reduced even further. It is clear that the counter current of the Marmara and the Straits, encountering this reduced current, will be reduced by the same degree. The Golden Horn is an irregular interior harbor, more than 7 kilometers long and an average of 300 meters wide, whose current is obstructed by bridges at a depth of 1-2 meters, especially between Haskoy and Silahdaraga, ships and various obstacles. The topographic situation actually greatly blocks the currents entering the Golden Horn from the Marmara and the Straits. Since, under these circumstances, the current to the Marmara will diminish with the Master Plan and the counter current also will be reduced at the same rate, the Golden Horn will soon become a polluted, putrid lake.

Since the Days of Fatih

History as we know it is filled with the Golden Horn. The fossils found during construction of the Alibey Dam, the inability yet to put the dam on a firm foundation and especially probes of the Golden Horn reflect this fact. In recent years, it has been determined that the Golden Horn is filling at a rate of 10 centimeters per year.

It is clear that the Master Plan, which envisages expenditure of 2 billion liras over 12 years, cannot produce a Golden Horn as clean as it was in pre-Reform /1839/ times. Because, from the days of Fatih until the time of the Reforms, laws had been meticulously applied to ensure the productivity of the Golden Horn streams and to prevent erosion, the Golden Horn and Kagithane had remained until recently a place for public outings and recreation; the currents of the Golden Horn had been

able to keep Kagithane and Alibey, with its more productive waters, clean and plentiful. While these stream waters created a strong current towards the Marmara, the Marmara and Straits counter current, which was cleaner than it is today, met fewer obstructions and was able to enter the Golden Horn. At the end of 12 years, the Master Plan will not even be able to restore to the Golden Horn the pre-Reforms conditions, because the Golden Horn has now been deprived, because of the Alibey Dam, of the Alibey stream waters which were the most productive of the streams with sources of plentiful, clean water in those days.

Golden Horn Cannot Be Cleaned without Current

Unless the Master Plan can solve the current and counter current problems in the Golden Horn, the Golden Horn cannot be cleaned up and cannot escape becoming a polluted lake in a short time. The real saviour of the Golden Horn is the flow of clean and plentiful water.

The Golden Horn is a serious threat to the 700,000 citizens who live near it, indeed to all the people of Istanbul, with its daily-growing filth; cleaning it up without delay is an urgent national problem. Public health cannot wait 12 more years in vain for the realization of the Master Plan. This problem must be solved without delay.

The Golden Horn and its environs can be saved only by a clean and plentiful current and the counter currents it will create. Since the Master Plan does not take this fact into account, all the measures to be applied will fail. The Master Plan needs to be revised. Ensuring clean and plentiful water to solve the Golden Horn's current and counter current problem must have priority over implementation of the Master Plan.

Current by Pump

The bulletins from the ITU Golden Horn symposium proposing that canals be dug from the Black Sea and Buyukdere have been debated and it has been determined that clean water currents cannot be obtained from such canals by gravity. The proposals are very valuable from the standpoint of revealing the real needs of the Golden Horn. Prior to these proposals, studies were made of the possibility of obtaining water currents (by pumping) by digging canals and tunnels from the Straits and were published in *TURKIYE MUHENDISLIK HABERLERI* magazine under the title "Proposal for a Solution to the Golden Horn Problem."

From the technical accounts, which could be the basis for a preliminary project, it was determined that a 550 kilowatt pump would be sufficient to raise a rate of flow of 15 m^3 of clean water per second an elevation of 3 meters. It was figured that this pump, which could work continuously for a period of 1 year, could handle up to 15 times the entire amount of water in the Golden Horn in return for expenditure of less than just 5 million kilowatt hours per year. The rate of flow of the Kagithane stream is about 8 m^3 per second. The 15 m^3 pumped rate of flow would amply provide the Golden Horn with the current of which it is deprived from the Alibey because of the dam.

By opening Buyuklere, Istinye and Baltalimani to the Golden Horn by digging canal-tunnels and raising the water from the Straits 3 meters, the proposal envisaged the selection of the Istinye-Golden Horn canal (bearing mind that the Istinye shipyard will be gone) as the one to provide the current in the Golden Horn. The total length of the canal-tunnel is 13 kilometers. The proposal gives no total excavation figure. Total excavation is about 3.5 million m³.

Civilized states have given great importance to marine transportation for three centuries. Three centuries ago, France connected the Mediterranean to the Atlantic with canals and long tunnels, making mass transportation very economical by internal waterways with more than 2,000 kilometers of artificial canals and tunnels. In recent times, Russia has connected the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea to the North Sea by deep, broad canals and tunnels to enable passage (of its destroyers and submarines). Construction of the Straits-Golden Horn cannal-tunnel is a very short, small project which we could carry out with our own resources.

Advantages of Golden Horn Canal-Tunnel

First of all, the true current of the Golden Horn, ensuring plentiful clean water, would save public health and the Golden Horn. The tunnel-canal area would be the industrial and business district and would provide great advantages to water transportation and the city of Istanbul as a tourist attraction and recreation spot and a public beach. It would be possible to replace facilities such as the Cubuklu oil depots which constantly threaten the Straits and even Istanbul with fire and the Eurusene coal depots which pollute the city with galleries which could be opened under the present hills. Implementation of the proposal before implementation of the Golden Horn Master Plan is an unavoidable technical and economic obligation. Revision of the Golden Horn Master Plan and final implementation program is a must.

8347

CSO: 7407

DECREPIT STATE OF GALATA BRIDGE DISCUSSED

Istanbul 8. GUN (HURRIYET) in Turkish 21 Sep 80 p 18

/Article by Erol Gonenc: "Decrepit Galata Bridge on Deathbed"/

/Text/ Galata Bridge, a unique and colorful place in public life throughout the caliphate and the republican periods to the present, is ill, on its deathbed. These are the saddest times of its century of life. The authorities, seeing that Galata Bridge cannot be saved from decay, are planning to build another bridge to replace it.

Pointing out that repair of Galata Bridge requires 1.2 billion liras annually, Istanbul municipal authorities say, "We will build a new bridge for 1.5 billion liras. It will be better." It is no longer possible for Galata Bridge to return to its former life. The Technical University signed its death certificate 10 years ago. But it had always seemed so strong -- this historic structure. The Galata Bridge, over which 80,000 vehicles and almost 2 million people pass daily, suddenly took ill and went into a coma, to use the authorities' expression. Now they are looking for a place to bury it. If a place can be found, they will build a monument to it and people will come to visit. If this cannot be worked out, it will be sold for scrap and the municipality will get a little money. Will Galata Bridge now become razor blades, or some other object rolled off at the mills? At present, only time will tell.

In the final days of a life of splendor and magnificence, the Galata Bridge is finding it very difficult to keep going. The caissons have rotted and hold water. One can feel it rocking like a cradle on its decayed platform when crossing. A strong suspension bridge will suffice to span the Marmara.

The Galata Bridge, its caissons like sponges, has been able to withstand the polluted waters of the Golden Horn for only a century. Holes are punched in the bottoms of the caissons everytime a TIR truck crosses.

The bridge was completely rebuilt in 1912, changing it from wood to its present state. No other repairs were made until 1966. Resting on a total of 45 caissons which act as carriers, footings and foundation, the Galata Bridge had two caissons replaced in 1966 by the Maritime Bank. In 1972, Technical University reports recommended rebuilding the bridge. Owing to the high cost of the Maritime Bank's caissons, the municipality began building caissons at its workshop in Balat and had replaced five caissons by 1980 and the government had agreed to allow 480 million liras for this purpose. Only 35 million of this was ever provided, however, and, as only 18 caissons have been replaced since 1974, it is again considered impossible for Galata Bridge to remain standing.

360 Tons of Water per Hour

Galata Bridge, with its caissons full of holes, withstands a waterflow of 360 tons per hour. The bridge itself, which is 466 meters long, 25 meters wide, 4.9 meters above the water and has 4.5-meter sidewalks, weighs 12,000 tons. Adding the water held by the caissons raises this weight to 20,000 tons.

There are 230 people working around the clock to keep Galata Bridge standing.

Surgery

They performed surgery on Galata Bridge in order to prolong its life a little. They removed the pedestrian caissons along its sides and the Adalar and Yalova ferry docks, and this prevented bumping by the ferries which was as dangerous as the corrosive waters of the Golden Horn. Of almost 60 kiosks, 30 have been vacated, and the number will rise to 50 by the first of the year.

Meanwhile, the municipal authorities said the following:

"It takes 1.2 billion biras to repair Galata Bridge. Yet a new one costs 1.5 billion liras. We will either make Galata Bridge into a museum or some facility for public use or a pedestrian bridge. If this cannot be done, we will sell it for scrap to get what we can out of it."

8349

CSO: 4907

PENALTIES DOUBLED FOR UNLICENSED GUNS

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 30 Sep 80 pp 1,13

/Text/ Ankara (HURRIYET) -- The law on the surrender of firearms was published in the RESMI GAZETE and went into effect yesterday. Accordingly, penalties will be doubled for the failure to surrender unlicensed firearms and ammunition, dynamite, bombs and similar instruments of destruction and death by the close of business hours on Monday, 13 October. According to the law, those having in their possession unlicensed weapons such as firearms and ammunition, dynamite, bombs and similar explosives, caustic chemicals, daggers, poniards, knives, sword canes, switch-blades, scimitars, sabers, swords, bayonets, pointed and grooved knives, clubs, knobbed whips, garrottes or chains and brass knuckles will be taken to court if they do not surrender such weapons to the local military or civilian authorities within 15 days.

The penalties written in the law will be doubled for those who do not surrender these weapons and items by the evening of Monday, 13 October.

Anyone who commits a crime using these weapons or is understood to be carrying them for purposes other than surrender within the 15-day period will not be pardoned.

Moreover, the new law which went into effect yesterday will be applied in regard to firearms crimes committed prior to 29 September.

How Are Weapons to Be Surrendered?

The General Staff Office of the Chief of Martial Law Military Services Coordination published a bulletin on the subject yesterday. The bulletin says:

"The form and procedure of surrender of weapons and explosives in accordance with the provisions of the law published in the RESMI GAZETE and entering into effect on 29 September 1980 will be carried out according to the following principles:

"Firearms, after being wrapped, empty, in cloth, nylon or paper and tied with string, and ammunition, magazines or other accessories, after being wrapped, will be placed in a bag tied shut or in a locked case and brought to the duty officers and surrendered.

"All packages containing weapons and explosives will be opened in the presence of the person surrendering them; the type and registration number, if any, of weapon surrendered, caliber and model, number of weapons, information pertaining to identification, and similar information, if any, on items other than guns will be determined and recorded.

"One copy of this record will be given to the person delivering the weapon.

"In accordance with article 2, one copy of the record will be kept at the place of surrender and the contents of this record will be assigned a number, sealed and entered in the record by the duty officer.

"Surrender and collection locations for weapons and explosives will be announced by the martial law commands, and citizens will surrender their weapons at these surrender and collection centers."

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